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ABSTRACT 
In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rose to power in the Japanese Diet, 
marking the first time in more than five decades that a party other than the Liberal 
Democratic Party controlled the government. Some would assume this monumental shift 
has the potential to bring about a range of policy changes, especially in the realm of 
security. This thesis addresses the potential for changes in security policy by evaluating 
two particular elements of the maritime security realm, ballistic missile defense and 
antipiracy. When considering the ability of the DPJ to influence security policy in Japan, 
the country’s political environment represents a unique situation, in which party influence 
must be weighed against the relative influence of societal norms and external factors. 
Taking this into consideration, it is concluded that DPJ influence will be limited, 
resulting in little potential for changes in security policy, as reflected in the assessment of 
elements of maritime security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Recent elections in Japan have seen a new party emerge, which has resulted in a 
new political dynamic. The rise to power of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has 
been a shift from the relatively stable, one-dimensional system of government under the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that had been in place for over five decades, and which 
saw limited challenges to its rule.1 Based on the stability of rule over the years, Japanese 
security policy was highly consistent. Some might suggest it was shaped more by the 
interaction of perspectives across society,2 the lone ruling party and the evolving security 
environment the country found itself in, rather than competing ideologies of multiple 
domestic parties. Therefore, given the election results of the last few years, the potential 
exists for a new approach to Japan’s security policy. This assumption is based on the 
ideology and rhetoric to emerge from the DPJ during its years as an opposition party, 
which questioned the nature of Japan’s security alliances under the LDP—for example, 
the country’s relationship with and reliance on the United States.  
Taking this into consideration, this thesis aims to address the possibility of a shift 
in Japanese security policy under the new domestic political conditions. More succinctly, 
now that the DPJ is the party in power, and the potential exists for a more dynamic party 
system, is it fair to assume Japan’s security policy will change—in particular, elements of 
its maritime security policy? Alternatively, is the expectation that the current approach to 
maritime security will remain the status quo? 
Addressing each element of Japan’s maritime security would be no small task. 
Therefore, this thesis examines those aspects of maritime security policy that pertain to 
Japan’s stance regarding its bilateral relationship with the United States, and its pursuit of 
broader multilateralism. Japan’s approach to ballistic missile defense is of particular 
                                                 
1 “Press Upbeat on Japan’s Elections,” BBC News August 31, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8230317.stm.  
2 The argument that security policy has been shaped by societal norms in Japan is drawn from authors, 
such as Peter J. Katzenstein, Thomas U. Berger, and Andrew L. Oros. 
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interest to the bilateral relationship with the United States. Likewise, analyzing Japan’s 
handling and involvement abroad in antipiracy efforts highlights potential interest in 
pursuing a more multilateral approach to maritime security. These two examples offer a 
foundation for discussing the potential for change based on the emergence of the DPJ, 
and whether or not the LDP will continue to influence security policy under this new 
two-party dynamic.  
In the course of answering the primary research question, this thesis addresses any 
potential underlying domestic factors that enabled the Japanese government to maintain 
its relatively consistent security policy while the LDP was the ruling party. Subsequent 
consideration is given as to whether those factors have or will remain in place under the 
DPJ, as well as what new factors may arise and have a similar effect. Additionally, while 
this thesis centers on the emerging domestic differences previously mentioned, 
consideration is also given to the role external influences have had on shaping Japanese 
maritime security policy throughout the years, in an effort to determine what 
relationships exist between the foreign and domestic elements. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
While it may be too soon to tell the full impact the recent elections will have on 
Japan’s security policy, the fact remains that for the first time, a party other than the LDP 
has a significant upper hand in the Diet, the country’s legislative body.3 In parallel with 
the longevity of the LDP, security policy in Japan had been fairly consistent and was 
shaped in an effort to support as stable an environment as possible in the Northeast Asia 
region. For Japan and the LDP during its period of rule, stability of the region was based 
on a strong alliance with the United States in the face of communism, while maintaining 
a balance between a capable yet constrained Self Defense Force (SDF). However, as new 
powers and threats emerge in the wake of the Cold War (particularly China and North 
Korea), the manner by which the new leadership of Japan involves the country in the 
region and in the international arena becomes increasingly important. For example, it will 
                                                 
3 Yoshihide Soeya, “Japanese Domestic Politics and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” Council 
on Foreign Relations, December 2009, 1. 
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be interesting to see how the new government reacts as the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) continues to project power into the Western Pacific, as it did in 2009,4 or 
should North Korea continue to conduct missile tests. Therefore, the importance of this 
thesis centers around identifying what aspects of Japan’s historical approach to security 
have the greatest potential to be changed under the DPJ, particularly in the maritime 
realm, thereby influencing policy, which in turn, has important implications for the 
United States.  
If a shift in security policy were to occur under the DPJ, the implications could 
affect the current dynamic of U.S.–Japan security relations. In its current state, the long-
standing alliance has been heavily reliant on U.S. military might, which has done much to 
shape the security environment of the region. However, if policy shifts were enacted in 
Japan that might enhance its military’s strength or change the manner in which the 
country employs its military, it could have a significant impact on the U.S.–Japan 
security alliance, as some suggest the United States would likely re-evaluate the necessity 
to contribute as heavily to security in the region.5 The trickledown effect could also result 
in potential changes to greater U.S. security strategy and have implications for regional 
stability. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The research question can be further broken down into clearly defined 
independent and dependent variables. The independent variable can be identified as the 
as the ruling party and nature of the governing process, in this case the DPJ and the new 
shape of the government. This thesis seeks to establish the potential impact such a 
variable may have on the dependent variable, Japan’s maritime security policy. However, 
this potential oversimplification of the two variables does little to establish a clear  
 
 
                                                 
4 Russel Hsiao, “PLAN East Sea Fleet Moves Beyond First Island Chain,” China Brief 10 (2010): 1–2. 
5 Scott Snyder, “U.S. Domestic Politics and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” 
Council on Foreign Relations. December 2009, 5. 
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relationship between them. Both the independent and dependent variables must be further 
divided into specific elements or factors that have the greatest potential to establish a 
causal relationship. Challenges to achieving this do exist. 
The first challenge is related to the DPJ. Although the party has been in existence 
for more than a decade, this is the first instance in the DPJ’s brief history that it is in 
control of the government. This is uncharted territory for the party, which has had few 
opportunities to implement policy and address those issues its leaders deem important. 
Therefore, based on the party’s short history, the challenge lies in identifying trends and 
factors within the party that may influence maritime security into the future. These could 
include the emergence of influential individuals within the party, such as Ichiro Ozawa, 
and their ability to promote a particular security policy; the party’s lack of governing 
experience;6 divisions within, and the general youthfulness of the party; and where 
security issues rank within the party’s overall policy agenda. Again, this is not an 
exhaustive list, but the importance in identifying factors such as these is to determine 
which have the greatest potential to effect change. Although the differences between the 
DPJ and LDP will be addressed in greater detail later in this thesis, it is important to 
recognize that for each factor indicating the DPJ’s ability to introduce policy change, the 
LDP is arguably different, whether it is based simply on party longevity and experience, 
or relative cohesiveness among party members on any number of security related issues. 
Likewise, a similar challenge can be found under the new multiparty dynamic. 
Although this dynamic is not the focal point of the thesis, consideration must be given to 
the fact that the approach to security in Japan over the years (to include maritime 
security), had occurred within the context of a single party system dominated by the LDP. 
Now that a second party has emerged (independent of the fact it has gained control of the 
government), the dynamics of a multiparty system have the potential to influence future 
security policy. For example, the potential exists for the decision-making process to 
change as party ideologies clash and compete with one another like never before. It is 
also conceivable that the new system dynamic could impact relationships that have been 
                                                 
6 “6th LD: Ozawa to Run Against Kan in DPJ Leadership Race,” Breitbart, 
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9HR59CG0&show_article=1.  
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built over the years between parties (particularly the LDP) and the bureaucracy. This 
dynamic could alter the policy implementation process, and perhaps make it considerably 
slower because of competition between the parties and the need to establish new 
relationships and rapport with bureaucrats. Countless other factors may come into play, 
but again, the challenge is in identifying those most relevant to the new ruling party that 
may have the greatest impact on maritime security policy. While much of the discussion 
on the independent variables centers on domestic elements and internal intricacies of 
parties and political systems, consideration must be given to the impact external factors 
have had and will have in the future. 
This thesis also addresses external factors that have historically influenced 
Japanese maritime security, and which have the potential to influence it in the future.7 
The challenge is to identify those external factors and events first that have led to 
consistency in policy over the years. These factors may include Japan’s political and 
economic concerns stemming from the country’s geographic nature as an island nation, 
the influence of the country’s post–World War II experience and subsequent adoption of 
Article 9 of the constitution on foreign and security policy, or the international context 
within which longstanding relationships, such as those with the United States, were built. 
Second, likely factors that have, or would result in changes to policy do exist. For 
example, the same relationships that may have been a steadying influence could change, 
or new relationships could be formed that result in a new approach to maritime security. 
Also, while Article 9 in its current state may have led to continuity in maritime security 
policy, if amended, it could potentially be a source for change. Finally, fluctuations in the 
international political environment, such as the end of the Cold War, may result in 
changes. Identifying these external factors will add another dimension to the thesis, as it 
will frame the greater security environment in which Japan has forged an existence and 
the influence it has had when formulating policy. More importantly, these factors can 
help to identify further differences between the LDP and the DPJ based on what was  
 
                                                 
7 For the purpose of the thesis and this proposal, external factors are considered those influences 
independent of political party and system characterizations, and may be foreign or domestic in nature.  
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historically important to the LDP and what may not carry the same weight for the DPJ. 
The international relations theories of constructivism and realism are used in hopes of 
facilitating this aspect of the thesis.   
Lastly, another important challenge to consider pertains to the potential for 
change in DPJ’s security policy, and subsequently, analyzing whether or not important 
elements of maritime security in particular will be changed. Based on the discussion of 
the independent variables above, it might be safe to assume that general security policy 
could change, perhaps even fairly quickly, under the new government and party dynamic. 
However, the question is whether or not such changes will permeate into maritime 
security in particular, and if they do, how so? For example, it is often noted that the DPJ 
promotes a shift in security policy more toward multilateralism and the United Nations 
over the U.S.–Japan alliance.8 Should this policy become precedent, could it result in 
ending Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) support to U.S. maritime assets in the 
Indian Ocean or a more active role in anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) 
region? Similarly, what implications would such a policy shift have on maritime ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) and the relationship Japan maintains with the United States? Do 
the potential outcomes in each case speak to policies of multilateralism abroad, while 
maintaining strong bilateral ties to the United States regionally? 
Having addressed the challenges associated with the independent and dependent 
variables, and determining factors that could reasonably effect and be influenced by 
change, the hypothesis of this thesis is that the newly elected DPJ alone will do little to 
change Japanese maritime security policy in the near term, as a number of variables 
independent of the party exist that have a greater potential to influence security policy. 
Among the factors to be considered are the nature of the security environment itself and 
how it has changed since the end of the Cold War, the role of societal norms, and the 
continued presence of the LDP. 
The influence of the factors listed above support the hypothesis in a number of 
ways. As for the nature of the security environment, the post-Cold War period has proven 
                                                 
8 Mari Miura, Kap Yun Lee, and Robert Weiner, “Who Are the DPJ?: Policy Positioning and 
Recruitment Strategy,” Asian Perspective 29 (2005): 72. 
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to be a dynamic period that has seen the communist threat replaced by a variety of other 
threats (China, North Korea, and terrorism) that the Japanese government must be willing 
to address. This process began under the LDP, and it is remains for the DPJ to maintain 
the country’s security. Given the circumstances, it would not be fruitful for the newly 
elected party to simply alter maritime security policy as a result of party ideological 
divides, particularly if it comes at the expense of the country’s security in general. Realist 
concerns with security represent a real challenge to the DPJ’s ability to influence and 
change maritime security policy, but domestic influences are also present as well. 
Pacifist norms and the LDP (now as an opposition party) represent further 
impediments to the DPJ’s ability to influence maritime security policy. Each date back to 
the post-World War II era and became entrenched in Japanese society. It is unlikely that 
the influence of either will diminish simply because of the DPJ’s rise to power, 
particularly in the near term. Each of these factors contributes to the argument that the 
DPJ is unlikely to influence and change elements of maritime security policy in the near 
future. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
For the purpose of this thesis, the review of existing literature is divided into two 
parts. The first section focuses on those factors to which authors attribute Japan’s 
historical approach to security, and serve as a backdrop for addressing maritime security. 
This will be followed by a discussion of the literature surrounding current domestic 
political dynamics and the DPJ since the recent elections, and how the party may handle 
maritime security. The information is used to identify the greater context within which 
this thesis fits, and how it contributes to greater research in the field. 
1. Maritime Security: Historic Factors 
A number of factors are identified in the existing literature that authors agree have 
historically influenced Japan’s leaders when making security-related decisions. The first 
factor mentioned often is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution: 
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Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.9 
Many authors use this as the foundation for their discussions, especially when identifying 
how and why the Japanese government has historically handled security related issues. 
For example, Richard Samuels offers one perspective as to how the constitution has been 
an influence, stating it has been “the primary formal restraint … and at the center of 
Japan’s most hotly contested legal disputes … about [its] original intent.”10 Other 
authors, while agreeing with this assessment, offer additional factors believed to have 
influenced Japan’s leaders and how they have shaped security policy. 
The greater international and regional security environments have also been 
identified in the literature as significantly influencing Japanese security policy through 
the years. Evelyn Goh cites shifts in international security conditions following the Cold 
War as an example of how Japan had to reevaluate its alliance with the United States 
based on “uncertainty about the American commitment to Asia.”11 Other events, such as 
September 11, the rise of China, or provocations on the part of North Korea, provide 
further examples of how shifts at the international and regional level have forced Japan to 
review its security policy. However, in addressing these issues, one factor pertaining to 
Japan’s security already mentioned has remained intact.  
Many of the authors who address the historical nature of Japanese security policy 
in the context of international and regional security describe one factor as having been 
consistent and influential. The strength of the U.S.–Japan alliance has endured, despite 
shifts in the realm of international security and subsequent “uncertainties” mentioned 
above. Kazuhiko Togo offers a relatively recent example of the importance Japan has 
                                                 
9 Japanese Constitution, Chapter II, art. 9 
10 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 45. 
11 Evelyn Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (2008): 366. 
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placed on the alliance, and references its position during the first round of the Six-Party 
Talks. Among Japan’s priorities for the meeting was “cooperation with Washington and 
consolidation of the U.S. and Japanese positions.”12 This alliance is an important 
example of how external security issues and relationships impact Japan’s security policy; 
however, other factors from the literature need to be discussed. 
While much of the literature discussed thus far has emphasized external factors 
that have influenced Japanese security policy, to include the role they played in the 
formation of the country’s constitution,13 domestic factors must be considered as well. 
The first factor to consider is the LDP and single party politics, which have been 
described as having had an equally important role in determining security policy for over 
50 years. Samuels describes how domestic politics under “mainstream LDP dominance” 
impacted security through the party and bureaucracy’s interpretation of Article 9 of the 
constitution.14 The relationship between the two would lead to the very formation of the 
SDF and further interpretation as to how the SDF would be permitted to operate into the 
future. The groundwork of this dynamic was laid during the immediate post-World War 
II and Cold War years, after which carefully balanced interpretations of “war potential” 
from Article 9 and achieving “minimum necessary [levels]” for self defense were 
continuously made, which allowed the LDP to eventually field a capable SDF without 
having to revise Article 9. 
Authors also go to great lengths to describe how the dynamics mentioned above 
have generated much debate in Japan over security. Although the LDP was the dominant 
party for so long, and the single-party system afforded it the opportunity to dictate 
security policy as it saw fit, the literature is quick to acknowledge that the party itself 
could not escape fracture on the issue of security. For example, debate over the SDF 
stemmed from interpretation of the constitution (as mentioned above), and as a result, 
divisions within the LDP have been evident for some time:  
                                                 
12 Kazuhiko Togo. “Japan and the New Security Structures of Asian Multilateralism,” in East Asian 
Multilateralism: Prospects for Regional Stability, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 185. 
13 Samuels, Securing Japan, 33.  
14 Ibid., 46.  
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Since that time [after the war], those who preferred the literal 
interpretation of Article 9 and those who have endeavored to loosen its 
constraints have contended for power within the LDP.15 
Other authors also highlight how these divisions over security over time would challenge 
the integrity of the LDP and single-party system. Nakanishi Hiroshi discusses how these 
changes to the domestic political structure were a result of “the departure of those… who 
were dissatisfied with [what had become] the status quo” of foreign policy and security, 
in turn facilitating the emergence of new parties representing a different stance on these 
issues.16 The discussion over divisions within the LDP and subsequent emergence of 
opposition parties speaks to the broader influence of society in general. A number of 
authors have furthered the discussion of security policy by considering the influence of 
society and its associated norms.   
The international relations theory of constructivism is offered frequently by a 
number of authors seeking to explain Japanese security policy, which adds another 
wrinkle to the discussion of policy evolution. Those advocating the theory and writing on 
the topic broadly suggest that domestically, there are “central tenets that have shaped 
Japan’s security practice for the past fifty years,”17 which is creating an antimilitarist (if 
not entirely pacifist) security identity subsequently reflected in security policy. While 
some authors may argue otherwise, this theory in support of a normative identity, 
combined with other domestic and external influences outlined above, are just a few 
examples of what authors have identified as driving factors behind Japanese security 
policy for several decades. It is within the context of these factors that authors are able to 
provide further granularity when discussing the evolution of Japan’s maritime security 
policy. 
                                                 
15 Richard J. Samuels, “Securing Japan: The Current Discourse,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 33 
(2007): 129.  
16 Hiroshi Nakanishi, “The Japan-US Alliance and Japanese Domestic Politics: Sources of Change, 
Prospects for the Future,” in The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia, ed. Michael H. 
Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center Publications, 2004), 106. 
17 Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 1. 
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Some authors of existing literature have been able to provide specific examples of 
areas in which maritime security has fallen into Japan’s broader security policy 
historically because of the factors mentioned previously. Samuels discusses how the 
relationship between international factors and Japan’s security policy in 1981 led to the 
decision by the MSDF to “patrol the sea lanes of communication as far as one thousand 
nautical miles.”18 Similarly, politicians in Japan have been forced to address maritime 
security issues stemming from the recent rise of China, particularly over the last two 
decades, and have oftentimes found that shifts in MSDF force posturing are “limited by 
constitutional constraints,”19 which, in turn, could be argued has its roots in more general 
societal norms of pacifism or antimilitarism. Keeping the findings of these discussions on 
Japan’s broader and more focused maritime security policy in mind, a review of existing 
literature pertaining to the potential impact of the DPJ is now provided. 
2. Maritime Security: Discussing the Future 
Just as the history of Japan’s maritime security has typically been framed by 
broader security policy, the same could be said for its future. Authors who have 
attempted to address the future security environment in Japan are quick to raise the fact 
that the emergence of the DPJ from the recent elections brings with it “a new era in 
Japanese politics and foreign policy.”20 Therefore, in an attempt to determine the future 
of security policy, some authors first look back to the past to identify initial elements of 
change. Nakanishi identifies the period of the 1990s as a time when a “semi-two-party 
system” is first seen, by citing the LDPs brief fall from power in 1993 and the emergence 
of opposition parties that began to forge a stronger political existence, as the first instance 
of security policies being brought into question.21  
Now that the DPJ is in power, and a multiparty system is more of a reality, the 
areas of security policy in which differences have been identified over the years serve as 
                                                 
18 Samuels, Securing Japan, 89. 
19 James Manicom, “Japan’s Ocean Policy: Still the Reactive State?” Pacific Affairs 83 (2010): 323. 
20 Hitoshi Tanaka and Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Foreign Policy and East Asian Regionalism,” Council 
on Foreign Relations, December 2009, 1. 
21 Nakanishi, “The Japan-US Alliance and Japanese Domestic Politics,” 107. 
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the basis for authors to forecast the future of Japanese security. Takashi Inoguchi and 
Paul Bacon provide some potential areas of departure from the status quo on the part of 
the DPJ. The two suggest the new party in power will emphasize a “pro-UN and pacifist 
orientation,” at the expense of relations with the United States, while showing greater 
concern over the validity of overseas deployments than their predecessors.22 Although 
more elaborate research establishing concrete evidence of this concept may take time to 
complete, some writers have commented on recent events that indicate the DPJ is 
following through on these stances. 
In the absence of in-depth literature regarding the future of Japan’s maritime 
security under the DPJ and multi-party system, greater value will be placed on articles, 
newspapers and blogs (sparingly) that track current events pertaining to the topic. Based 
on recent news and posts, it could be possible to surmise that the under the DPJ, the 
policies of the Japanese government have shifted to some degree and reflect those 
previously suggested. For example, Peter Ennis recently posted in his blog that relations 
between the United States and Japan have been strained in the wake of the Iraq War, as 
Japan seeks a “‘more equal’ alliance relationship.” He also references the priority placed 
on orienting policy towards that of the UN.23 While this type of analysis and information 
is important, it highlights the fact that research still needs to be done to address the 
impact the new domestic political dynamic will have on maritime security. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis seeks to identify the potential for the DPJ to effect change in maritime 
security policy in Japan. Therefore, a basic historical study of maritime security policy 
during LDP rule and the single party system that existed for more than five decades will 
serve as a starting point for addressing this potential for change following the recent 
shifts in domestic politics. Constructivist and realist theory will be useful in facilitating 
                                                 
22 Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon. “Rethinking Japan as an Ordinary Country,” in The United 
States and Northeast Asia, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2008), 94. 
23 Peter Ennis, “The Iraq War’s damage to US-Japan relations,” Dispatch Japan, September 1, 2010, 
http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2010/09/the-iraq-wars-damage-to-us-japan-relations.html.  
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this discussion, as it will help to identify the domestic concerns and international context 
the LDP faced in the past, and under which maritime security policy was formed. For 
example, by analyzing the policies that emerged during the period from the end of World 
War II to the end of the Cold War, the theories can speak to the broader international 
security concerns and influences for Japan, the role of societal norms,24 and the manner 
in which the LDP addressed them, which resulted in the specific security policies to 
emerge during these periods. The results of such analysis can then be used as a baseline 
to measure the potential for consistency or change in maritime security policy under the 
new ruling party and domestic dynamic.  
By drawing comparisons between the LDP and DPJ, this thesis assesses the 
likelihood that elements of Japanese maritime security previously mentioned could 
change. Among those aspects of maritime security to be considered are the continued 
strength of Japan’s bilateral alliance with the United States, and focusing primarily on the 
efforts of the two countries in the field of ballistic missile defense, as well as Japan’s 
pursuit of and role in more multilateral efforts abroad, which emphasizes its participation 
in antipiracy efforts in the HOA region. This is not to suggest that these two elements of 
maritime security are representative of policy across the board, as other aspects could 
potentially indicate change or lack thereof. Among these changes are the future 
development of force composition; interoperability exercises and operations with current 
strategic partners both regionally and abroad, and the potential to develop future 
relationships; and maritime force projection and posturing, within the context of the 
current and potentially amended constitution. However, priority is given to BMD and 
antipiracy in this thesis based on their importance to U.S security interests. 
Based on the recentness of the emergence of the DPJ and the multiparty system in 
Japan, a majority of the sources for the comparative aspect of this thesis are drawn from 
journal and newspaper articles. Recent papers and studies from organizations, such as the 
Council on Foreign Relations and the Congressional Research Service on the topic are 
drawn from them as well. Papers and articles on the topic from these sources, along with 
                                                 
24 This thesis assumes that societal norms are important for any representative body to address.  
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those pertaining to maritime security, should prove useful, as they will provide the most 
current information on the recently occurring events, from which patterns and estimates 
might be established in the course of this thesis. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis continues with an international relations (IR) analysis of the broader 
security policies that emerged in Japan during three periods: post-World War II, the Cold 
War, and post-Cold War. This IR approach emphasizes constructivist and realist 
interpretations of Japan’s security policies. The influential factors derived from these 
interpretations are then measured against one another and the ruling party (in this section, 
mainly the LDP). This analysis is being done to weigh the impact of the party against 
other factors in shaping policy in general, which serves as the foundation for discussing 
the DPJ and whether it has the potential to influence maritime security policy in later 
chapters. 
Having contextualized the general influence parties have relative to other factors 
in shaping and forming security policy, the discussion then turns to the differences 
between the LDP and DPJ (both structural and ideological), each parties’ outlook on 
security in general as reflected in their stance on maritime security policy, and most 
importantly, how the new party may seek to change policy. This last aspect of the 
discussion centers on the parties’ perspectives on Japan’s bilateral alliance with the 
United States, and how each is reflected in ballistic missile defense, along with their 
stance on multilateral efforts, as reflected in involvement abroad in antipiracy efforts.  
After identifying the stance of the DPJ relative to the LDP on the aforementioned 
topics, the discussion focuses on the most current maritime security policies tied to BMD 
and antipiracy, and the role and perspective the DPJ had on the policy formation and 
implementation process. These policies are weighed against expectations of what the DPJ 
might have argued for based on its structure and ideology. From this analysis, 




influences as driving factors of Japan’s maritime security policy today, in addition to 
simple institutional practices that may or may not serve as obstacles to the DPJ’s ability 
to change policy in the applicable areas. 
Having established the potential for change (or lack thereof) in maritime security 
under the new domestic political dynamic, the last chapter offers final thoughts on the 
findings, and contextualizes them within the current international security environment. 
For example, given how the DPJ has addressed BMD and antipiracy, some conclusions 
can be drawn as to how the party may approach other maritime and broader security 
issues. Consideration are also given to areas in which the new government may make or 
has made any changes to maritime security policy, as has been the case with Indian 
Ocean refueling operations. The results of the research are also a used to expand briefly 
the discussion as to what impact the DPJs decisions on BMD and antipiracy may have 
beyond Japan. Particular consideration is given to the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
and relations with other regional actors as BMD progresses, along with the potential for 
Japan to develop new alliances abroad as it becomes more involved in antipiracy efforts. 
Finally, the influence of recent events and potential future events on maritime security 
policy under the DPJ, with the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami, as well as the 
potential for continued provocative activity by the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) or China serving as points of discussion is also considered.  
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II. JAPAN’S SECURITY POLICY AND ITS SOURCES  
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: it aims to identify some of the important 
factors that have influenced the direction of security policy since the end of World War 
II, and to address the evolution of broader Japanese security policy over the same period 
of time. This task is valuable for a variety of reasons. First, the manner by which the 
country was rebuilt and emerged from the war produced a variety of influential domestic 
and foreign factors that have created a unique and dynamic security environment for 
Japan. Analyzing the combination of these factors offers valuable insight into the broader 
security priorities and the subsequent policies to emerge during the period. More 
importantly, this analysis contextualizes the role and influence of political parties in the 
process of shaping and implementing such policy, all of which is useful for subsequently 
discussing the potential influence of the DPJ on maritime security policy.  
As no theory singlehandedly explains this evolution of Japan’s security policy, a 
focused discussion on the international relations theory of constructivism offset against 
realist balancing theory provides the clearest picture possible of the more influential 
factors and important security policies within the country. To reiterate, it is not the goal 
of this thesis to advocate or challenge constructivist or realist posits regarding the 
security policy of Japan. Rather, the constructivist arguments, coupled with realist 
counter-arguments, are both relevant and useful in determining the role and influence of 
political parties in shaping security policy in general. 
A. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ARGUMENT 
A number of academics have used the international relations theory of 
constructivism to explain Japanese security policy since the end of World War II. Those 
advocating the theory and writing on the topic broadly suggest that domestically “central 
tenets that have shaped Japan’s security practice for the past fifty years,”25 exist, which 
created an antimilitarist, if not entirely pacifist security identity. Building on this 
constructivist argument, these “central tenets” are norms prevalent across Japanese 
                                                 
25 Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice, 1. 
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society, which have emerged and become entrenched over time as a result of society’s 
collective experience and identity, particularly since the end of World War II. These 
norms include an “underlying fear of the military [that] has remained strong into the 
present era,”26 and an emphasis on developing the economy in lieu of traditional military 
might. The notion that such norms are highly influential in shaping security policy is 
particularly relevant when attempting to determine the influence and role of a country’s 
domestic political structure as well. This notion is all the more relevant in the case of 
Japan, as the recent domestic events provide a foundation for discussing the balance 
between these normative and structural factors, and subsequently, raise the question of 
how viable each is in explaining how Japanese security policy is formed.  
The remainder of this chapter begins with a brief narrative of Japan’s security 
policy since the end of World War II. The discussion then shifts to an outline of 
constructivist theory, and includes ways in which norms might influence security policy. 
Examples supporting this argument then are drawn from the narrative of Japan’s security 
policy throughout the years, in an effort to highlight how norms and identity might shape 
security policy. While this sets the context for determining whether a constructivist 
argument holds true for Japan, it also facilitates a discussion of what other factors play 
into the formation of security policy, both internal and external to Japan (the realist 
theory of balancing offers an alternative explanation of the influence of external factors, 
in addition to discussing the role of political structure as a means of providing depth to 
the discussion). Lastly, the chapter concludes with a summary and overall assessment of 
how effective each of these theoretical explanations is in promoting the influence of each 
factor on shaping Japanese security policy, and alludes to the limited influence of 
domestic political structures and any subsequent changes to it.  
 
                                                 
26 Thomas U. Berger, “Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation,” in 
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 393. 
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B. JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II 
The purpose of tracing Japan’s security policy since the end of World War II is 
simply to identify hallmark events, basic trends, and practices of the past 50 to 60 years, 
independent of theoretical explanations for such policies. Theoretical arguments can then 
be applied to this information in an effort to explain the policy outcomes. The section is 
divided into three time frames: post-World War II years, Cold War years, and post-Cold 
War years. Once the important events and policy trends have been identified from each 
period, the constructivist argument is applied, as well as how to assess its validity in 
explaining Japanese security policy against that of realist balancing, and the importance 
of domestic structures.  
1. Post-World War II (1945–1952) 
Security policy in the aftermath of World War II was heavily shaped by Japan’s 
loss, and more importantly, by the allied (predominantly U.S.) occupation. The objective 
at the time was to demilitarize the country, and “remove all obstacles to the revival and 
strength[en]ing of democratic tendencies.”27 This focus on demilitarization was echoed in 
the new Japanese constitution, in particular in Article 9: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.28 
These examples during the post-World War II period are indicative of a time when 
security policy was not entirely in the hands of the Japanese people. It is important to 
understand that despite the fact they were not the sole architects, elements of the policies 
                                                 
27 “Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan” (Potsdam Declaration), July 26, 1945, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1945 2, pt. 2 (1960): 1474–1476. 
28 Japanese Constitution, Chapter II, art. 9. 
 20
of this period still endure today (i.e., Article 9); “[however], with the onset of the Cold 
War, Japan began to move away from this highly demilitarized stance.”29 
2. Cold War Years (1952–1991) 
External events and influences were responsible for drawing Japan into the Cold 
War, which forced a change in the country’s approach to security policy. The role of the 
United States remained important. For example, as the Cold War was unfolding, some 
American policy makers (such as George Kennan) viewed Japan as a center of industrial 
power.  As a result, it was a critical element to keeping Soviet expansion in check, which 
was a reversal from previous pacifist policies. NSC 13/2 speaks to this reversal, stating 
“if Russia continues to present threat to world peace which she does today… we must 
retain allied forces in Japan or we must permit Japan to re-arm.”30 This reversal served as 
the foundation for further change in security policy as the Cold War progressed. 
As the Cold War progressed, Japan had clearly departed from full demilitarization 
in aligning itself with the United States and beginning to develop a capable SDF. The 
security relationship was first solidified in 1960 with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, and was revisited during 
the course of the Cold War. Whereas the 1960 treaty placed much of Japan’s security 
needs in the hands of the United States, by 1978 the nature of the relationship was 
beginning to change. The 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation called for 
“closer coordination of U.S. and Japanese forces … bilateral cooperation relating to 
Japan’s immediate defense … and for cooperation in regional contingencies in the Far 
East.”31 This dynamic expanded the country’s ability to provide for its own self-defense, 
while remaining under the greater U.S. security umbrella. Japanese security policy had 
evolved during this period and was more proactive than ever since the end of World War 
II. Calls for further expansion and increased capability of the JSDF under the National 
Defense Programme Outline are indicative of this evolution, although the reasons behind 
                                                 
29 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (New York: Routledge, 2009), 23. 
30 NSC 13/2: “Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan,” October 7, 
1948, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 6 (1974): 858–862. 
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such calls for expansion were “not a result of U.S. pressure, but rather because of 
growing fear about abandonment,” following Nixon’s Guam Doctrine of 1969.32 
However, “remilitarization… was subject to significant brakes,”33 as evidenced by the 
decision “to keep defense spending below one percent of GNP”34 and the fact that 
security remained heavily tied to the United States.  This situation was the pattern 
throughout the Cold War, although with its end came the necessity for further 
reappraisals of Japanese security policy. 
3. Post Cold War Years (1991–Present) 
As Christopher Hughes has stated, Japan has been faced with a number of 
decisions about its security policy due to “changes in the regional and global security 
environment since the end of the Cold War.”35 First, the once bipolar international 
system has become dominated for the time being by the United States, and although 
Japan has kept close ties with its Cold War partner since, the security policy of orienting 
with the United States against a monolithic communist threat has become less relevant. 
Next, other regional concerns have emerged in the absence of the Soviet threat, namely, 
the threat from a nuclear capable North Korea, and the emergence of China as an ever-
growing economic and military power. These concerns, coupled with significant world 
events, such as 9/11 and subsequent wars in the Middle East, have forced Japan to re-
evaluate (with greater frequency) its once relatively consistent security policies, in an 
effort to determine the role it will play beyond its borders.  
Now that the basic elements of Japanese security policy through the years have 
been outlined, the constructivist explanation behind why such policy was formed can 
now be discussed. The realist explanation of balancing is then briefly discussed, in 
addition to the role of domestic structures to provide alternative explanations. The three 
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are then weighed against one another to determine their validity in explaining both 
Japan’s security policies of the past, and those of the future given the more recent 
changes in the country’s domestic political environment.  
C. EXPLAINING SECURITY POLICIES OF THE PAST 
Before addressing the constructivist explanation of Japan’s security policy 
following World War II, a brief review of the theory is provided. Constructivist theory 
argues that culture, identity, and norms, which are formed over time by a society’s 
collective experience, influence the interests and subsequent policies of states. One 
advocate of the theory, Peter Katzenstein, more eloquently defines constructivism in 
terms of norms “whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw 
power or rational calculations… [and] typically inform how political actors define what 
they want to accomplish.”36 In a broader theoretical context, this concept proves useful in 
explaining why states displaying certain characteristics and strengths (i.e., relative wealth 
or power) pursue and implement policies that seem counterintuitive to such traits. 
Furthermore, from a security perspective, this concept can offer insight regarding: 
[The] tactical predispositions of specific military services, to broader 
strategic preferences of a nation or military, to the broadest national 
interests and international security norms.37 
In the case of Japan, the next step is to apply these constructivist concepts in an effort to 
determine what the theory argues are the reasons behind the security policy that has 
emerged since the end of World War II.  
1. Application of Constructivism to Japanese Security Policy of the Past 
Before attempting to test the validity of the constructivist argument amidst recent 
changes for Japan, it would be useful to analyze and assess its validity with respect to 
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Japanese security policy of the past. Therefore, similar to Peter Katzenstein’s approach,38 
the events, trends and practices of the World War II and Cold War periods previously 
outlined are analyzed through the constructivist lens. The two periods of time are 
assessed on the following three criteria: the societal climate, external influences, and 
domestic actors (leaders).  This assessment is done in an effort to determine the existence 
and role of pacifist norms, how they were formed, and their influence on the policy that 
emerged during those times. 
a. Post–World War II Period 
As a reminder prior to assessing the role of norms in post-World War II 
Japanese security policy, the key security trends, events, and practices of the period 
included the occupation (primarily) by the United States, the demilitarization of Japan, 
and Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. The first trend produced the subsequent events 
and practices. This trend also speaks to the role of external influences and greater societal 
climate in producing a pacifist norm, which in turn, influenced security policy. 
Constructivists argue that the efforts of the U.S. led occupation to demilitarize Japan 
“were designed to downgrade the military profession in the eyes of the public… [and 
involved] a thorough campaign to discredit the former Japanese armed forces and prevent 
their restoration.”39 Coupled with the fact that World War II ended in embarrassing 
defeat and unconditional surrender, it makes sense that an “anti-militarist climate of 
opinion was generated”40 across greater society. 
Some evidence that the occupation had successfully produced greater 
societal norms of anti-militarism and pacifism is reflected in the domestic rhetoric and 
action taken concerning the Japanese education system: 
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The climate was encouraged by the firing of all “nationalistic” 
schoolteachers (those who had been military officers or executives of 
veterans organizations) and widespread censorship of textbooks to remove 
any favorable references to past military heroes and victories.41 
Of course, arguably the most important indicator that pacifist norms had 
permeated society and were influencing security policy was the ratification of the 
Japanese “Peace Constitution” with its hallmark, Article 9.  
While the bulk of Article 9 speaks to security policy, pacifist norms are 
echoed in the first sentence, “aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order.”42 That this document contained such words, and was ratified by Japanese 
leaders, reinforces the constructivist argument that pacifist norms existed across society, 
and in this case, were being addressed and finding their way into security policy. The 
constructivist argument that norms have influenced Japanese security policy does not end 
with the post-World War II period. Rather, it serves as a foundation for discussing its 
applicability during the Cold War. 
b. Cold War Period  
In similar fashion, some of the important security trends, events, and 
practices of the Cold War period are revisited prior to applying the constructivist 
argument. These include the continued role of the United States during the period, the 
formation and role of the SDF, the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of 1976, 
and the defense budget.  
This assessment of the constructivist argument during the Cold War period 
begins with the security trend of continued relations with the United States, and attempts 
to identify how norms factored into this policy. This trend was easily anti-militarist and 
pacifist in nature during the post-World War II period. However, after only a few short 
years, this changed, and “demilitarization was… stood on its head as growing tensions 
with the Communist world prompted Americans to rethink Japan’s possible defense role 
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in East Asia.”43 This reversal seems to complicate the constructivist argument, as the one 
major external influence responsible for ensuring demilitarization and promoting 
pacifism was calling for Japan to rearm. The uniformity of norms across the three criteria 
for evaluating their influence on security policy no longer existed. Despite this shift in 
priorities for the United States, which eliminates an external source of pacifist norms, the 
interaction among the three criteria provide enough examples of how pacifist norms 
influenced the security policy to emerge during this period.  
While the policy reversal of the United States did much to push Japan 
toward rearmament, the pacifist norms across greater Japanese society did much to 
temper efforts to do so. The issues associated with the formation and role of the SDF 
speak to this. As domestic actors were faced with having to address legitimate security 
concerns and took heed of Washington’s call to rearm, the greater societal climate 
continued to reflect pacifist tendencies. Although the SDF would be formed, the fact that 
its role during this period has been subject to interpretation, underscores the power such a 
societal climate had on Japanese security policy. Douglas Mendel traces this back to the 
occupation years, and “how effective the demilitarization reforms… were in the wake of 
the Japanese public’s disillusion with their own military.”44 He even draws from studies 
done from August to September 1957, including his own regional ones, which asked 
“should Japan in the future try to follow American policy in various matters?”45  While 
not exact, the numbers of each study done were quite similar, with only approximately 
one-third of the population responding “yes.” The other two-thirds either responded “no,” 
or “other; don’t know.” Therefore, in some regard, the very external factor that had now 
shifted its perspective to rearmament was still responsible for the societal pacifist stigma 
that would keep the governments security policies in check for the duration of the Cold 
War. 
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Other examples of greater societal pacifism influencing government 
security policy decisions were seen in the 1970s as well. The 1976 NDPO, for example, 
was the government’s “long term defense policy… based on the concept of threshold 
deterrence and the mobilization of a ‘standard defense’ force.”46 Although it called for 
modernization of the SDF and the ability to respond to threats, Katzenstein and Okawara 
argue that the terminology in the NDPO is vague and limiting, representative of 
“prevailing domestic political sentiments at the time.”47 Lest the constructive argument 
sound redundant, however, another factor had to play into the pacifist tendencies of the 
time, which can be found in the domestic actors who in the long run enacted the security 
policies.  
The LDP was the party that had the difficult task of juggling public 
opinion, with the needs of the day, to include addressing security issues; but more existed 
to the dynamic of implementing certain security policies than just catering to societal 
pacifism. McClain emphasized that: 
Organizationally the LDP functioned as a party of factions. Throughout its 
political heyday a half dozen or so major alliances jockeyed with one 
another for influence… Because of its coalitions, the LDP advocated an 
eclectic set of policies, even while projecting an image of conservative 
pragmatism.48 
Although much of the internal squabbling was over domestic issues, the 
1960 revision of the United States-Japan Security Treaty was one example of party 
factionalism causing a stir. The ruling faction under Kishi Nobusuke faced stiff 
opposition, but managed to pass the treaty extension. This example, although not a solid 
example of pacifism within the LDP, shows how domestic actors during the Cold War 
not only had to contend with pacifist society and the opposition parties in government, 
but opposition from within as well.  
Having outlined a constructivist argument for explaining Japanese security 
policy from the end of World War II through the Cold War, a case can be reasonably 
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made that a number of factors played into the formation and perpetuation of pacifist 
norms during the period of time. Alone, neither one can explain the existence of such 
norms. For example, if an attempt is made to argue that pacifist norms were simply 
inherent across greater Japanese society, a legitimate question then follows: Would they 
have been as prevalent and had as great an impact if the occupation had not encouraged, 
if not outright forced, such pacifism in the postwar years? Therefore, no one factor alone 
can support the constructivist argument; but together, they make a valid case for the way 
norms influence Japanese security policy. Other theories, such as that of realist balancing, 
offer different explanations as to how security policy is formed, which are equally as 
useful in understanding the relative influence domestic structure truly has in shaping and 
implementing security policy.  
2. Balancing–A Realist Argument 
In an effort to provide depth to the discussion regarding the formation and 
implementation of security policy in Japan, briefly discussing the theory of balancing can 
offer an alternative explanation of Japan’s post-World War II and Cold War years. First, 
as it pertains to structural realist theories, balancing falls under a systems level of 
analysis, which would describe the international environment in which Japan exists as 
being anarchic in nature. Also, as a primary actor within the system, little regard is given 
to domestic apparatus in Japan. Building off these most basic of realist assumptions and 
drawing heavily from Stephen Walt, balancing occurs when states form an alliance to 
protect against the threat posed by an opposing state or alliance, and occurs for two 
reasons: 
First, [states] put their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potential 
hegemon before it becomes too strong… Second, joining the weaker side 
increases the new member’s influence within the alliance, because the 
weaker side has greater need for assistance.49 
Walt’s posit is applied to the events previously outlined from the periods above (mainly 
the Cold War), but not in an extended discussion.  
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Using Walt’s description and reasoning behind balancing to understand the 
Japanese security situation from the end of World War II through the Cold War, the 
theory would argue that based on Japan’s external security environment, it felt the need 
to balance against a potential threat. In that sense, Japan saw the Soviet Union as a threat 
to its security, and therefore, balanced with the United States against it. This argument 
does make sense, as the Soviet Union was certainly a proximate threat based on 
geography. However, the second argument of balancing may be questionable. 
Walt’s argument that a state would join the weaker side because of a relatively 
greater amount of influence it would have, and the need for assistance on the part of the 
weak, does not seem to fit Japan’s security profile of the entire period. Much of the 
discussion under the constructivist section pertains to Japan’s weakened state in the wake 
of World War II. Thus, the country had little it could offer the United States; not to 
belabor the point, but the United States also further weakened Japan during the 
occupation and demilitarization, which is certainly not characteristic of a state in need of 
assistance. Therefore, the balancing argument may not hold as much weight for Japan 
during the postwar and early Cold War years, or any other state to have suffered such 
defeat and dismantling. What about after Japan began to rearm and modernize militarily 
with its economic success as the Cold War progressed?  
The case for the second balancing argument may improve as the Cold War 
progressed. Periods of perceived Soviet strengthening relative to the United States, 
coupled with rearming and subsequent modernizations of the SDF, such as those 
undertaken following the 1976 NDPO, speak to a weaker United States valuing a stronger 
Japan. Perhaps the best case to be made is that periods in which balancing is more 
applicable than others do occur. Neither advocating, nor dismissing this realist theory, the 
more pertinent take away is that both theories offer a legitimate a case for explaining the 
security policy to emerge in Japan from the post-World War II period through the Cold 
War. Perhaps each will prove equally useful in piecing together and explaining Japanese 
security policy since the end of the Cold War, and, thereby, providing a degree of 
perspective in determining the role of domestic structure in the process, especially 
following the recent domestic changes there.  
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D. CONSIDERING THE FUTURE OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY 
The subsequent sections seek to identify some of the major security events of 
interest to Japan in this era since the end of the Cold War. Once they have been 
identified, a similar constructivist/realist discussion is offered in an attempt to discern 
how the policies of the period are potentially being shaped and implemented, and where 
domestic structural changes factor into the process. This discussion proves most useful 
for subsequent chapters, as the discussion also helps identify important security issues for 
Japan in which maritime security may have a prominent role.  
1. Security Events of the Post-Cold War 
Major security events for Japan since the end of the Cold War have been marked 
by a shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world, the emergence of regional nuclear, military, 
and economic powers, and dramatic acts of terror by non-state actors, followed by allied 
efforts to squelch out such security threats all over the world. Amidst these rather 
significant changes in Japan’s security environment, there has been as significant turmoil 
has occurred in producing a consistent security policy. In an attempt to piece together 
some of the major policy decisions to emerge during this time, it is possible to identify 
where Japan has attempted to engage its regional partners more unilaterally. Attempts 
have been made to involve the SDF abroad,50 and Japan, at times, has sought to exert 
itself more in its alliance with the United States. These events serve as a foundation for 
presenting the constructivist and realist explanations of Japan’s more recent security 
policy.  
2. Constructivist Explanation of Recent Security Policy 
Turning to the constructivist explanation of more recent security related events for 
Japan, the first to be addressed is the shift from a bipolar security environment to one that 
has been more or less dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War. 
Recall that in the bipolar environment of the Cold War, Japan maintained close ties to its 
post-World War II occupier. This single relationship did much to stoke the fires of 
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pacifist norms initially, but later also called for a rearmed Japan. Pacifism seemed strong 
enough to have endured such pressures from the outside however, despite the emergence 
of a modern and capable SDF. Today, notice that the United States and Japan have 
continued their alliance, and Japan has even increased its ability to operate outside of 
simple self-defense, as evidenced by numerous defense reviews from 1995 to 1997, and 
in “[providing] non-combat logistical and reconstruction support to the US-led coalitions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.”51 The key term in the sentence above, however, is “non-
combat;” it would appear some concern for maintaining pacifist tendencies still exists. 
However, how do such tendencies hold up in the face of a rapidly evolving regional 
environment? 
While a degree of consistency that the dynamics of the U.S.-Japan alliance has 
done little to eliminate pacifism as factor influencing Japanese security policy does 
appear, it might be expect that as regional concerns increase, action might be taken to 
reduce the effects of such norms. However, if the constructivist argument is correct, 
pacifist norms will temper the approach to dealing with the rise of new regional powers 
that may pose a threat to Japanese security. Depending on the threat however, the result 
has varied. Concerning nuclear North Korea, the leadership “has been cautious not to 
sound soft on North Korea… [but] approves of economic sanctions… and have called for 
reinforcing Japan’s maritime security posture to counter North Korean spy boats and 
smuggling.”52 This attitude seems to be more of a hard-line approach to dealing with a 
threat than seen in the past out of Japan, and with a state such as North Korea, such 
policy could lead to escalation that might force Japan to have to take military action it has 
not done in the past 50 to 60 years. Dealing with other countries in the region has 
produced a different tone, one that is more pacifist in nature. 
China’s economic rise and increased military strength could pose just as much of 
a threat to Japan as North Korea, if not more so. The fact China has become the second 
largest economy in the world, while Japan remains in heavy debt, coupled with its efforts 
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to modernize militarily, could be perceived as a tremendous threat to which Japan should 
respond with even more aggressive policy than against North Korea if necessary. 
However, in this case: 
[The] Japanese role is premised on the perceived necessity to work 
together with other East Asian countries who share the same interests and 
agenda, as demonstrated by former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi in 
2002 when he advanced the concept of an East Asian Community.53 
This sort of policy and rhetoric speaks at the very least to continued antimilitarism, if not 
entirely pacifist security policy, and are examples of how the dynamic between the 
greater societal climate, domestic actors, and external influences may still indicate 
pacifist norms play into the formation of broader security policy for Japan. Two more 
examples that further support the existence of pacifist norms are seen in Okinawa and the 
cap on defense spending. While the events surrounding this island are worthy of their 
own thesis, suffice it to say that calls for the relocation of U.S. facilities on the island are 
indicative of pacifism. Similarly, the self-imposed cap on defense spending at one percent 
reflects a desire to limit military expansion, again an indication that pacifism is present in 
Japanese society. However, just as was the case in analyzing the post World War II and 
Cold War periods, an alternative explanation is offered. 
3. Realist Explanation of the Post-Cold War Period 
In an even more concise manner, an alternative explanation to the constructivist 
argument is offered. Keeping with balancing theory, it would be expected to see Japan 
balance against a potential hegemonic threat to its security. In this case, it is possible to 
look at a hegemonic threat, both regional or global, in two ways. If speaking from a 
regional perspective, the threat would more than likely be associated with China, and for 
similar reasons as to why the Soviet Union was a threat, based on geographic proximity. 
However, if looking at the situation through a global lens, the threat becomes the United 
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States, and Japan would balance with those in its region to counter the threat. However, 
does this really add up based on the security events and policies outlined in the post-Cold 
War period? 
It would be difficult to argue that Japan is balancing at the global level against the 
United States. The countries have maintained their close ties despite any desires among 
domestic actors calling for a change in the dynamic of the alliance. Nor does balancing 
fully explain Japan’s handling of regional threats. Engaging China through an East Asian 
Community forum and handling North Korea with economic sanctions does little to 
support a realist balancing argument centered on relative power and security. However, 
the post-Cold War environment is still young and evolving, and Japan is not the only 
state adapting its security policies in “real time.” As the environment unfolds, the 
balancing argument may become more and more relevant.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical explanations offered by constructivism and realist balancing serve 
as a mechanism for identifying important security concerns that have been prominent in 
Japan throughout the years, and the policies the country has formed and implemented to 
address them.  The constructivist argument that Japan’s collective experience has shaped 
a pacifist identity, and in turn, influenced the formation of security policy in Japan is a 
reasonable explanation for the policies that have emerged since the post-World War II 
period. Likewise, realist-balancing theory presents some valid arguments regarding why 
Japan pursued the security policies it has throughout the years. However, neither the 
constructivist norms of pacifism, nor balancing, adequately answer each question 
involving the state’s security policies. It is apparent that a combination of factors and 
explanations are necessary to understand the nature of Japanese security policy fully. Part 
of such an understanding includes determining the role and influence of domestic 
structure and parties in shaping security policy. This discussion helps contextualize their 
role in the policy formation process, and it is from this point it is possible to address the 
impact and role of these domestic factors both in the past under the LDP, and currently, 
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under the recently elected DPJ. Lastly, the broader concerns outlined above will help in 
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III. COMPARING THE LDP AND THE DPJ: STRUCTURE AND 
IDEOLOGY AS REFLECTED IN MARITIME SECURITY POLICY 
Having used general international relations theories to contextualize the role of 
domestic actors and structure in the policy formation process, the discussion of this 
chapter turns to the parties that have ruled Japan since the end of World War II. The 
narrative consists of the background of the LDP, its perception of Japan’s broader 
security environment through the years, and its experience and perceived involvement in 
shaping and implementing security policy relative to other factors outlined in Chapter II, 
offset against a brief discussion of the DPJ, namely its background and points of 
departure with the LDP pertaining to maritime security policy, which is expanded upon in 
the next chapter. 
A. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY  
This discussion of the LDP will briefly highlight its origins and background, 
followed by an outline of the party’s views of Japan’s broader security environment 
throughout the years. In addressing these views, consideration is given to the influence 
the party has had in shaping and implementing security policy relative to the normative 
and external factors previously outlined by constructivist and realist theories in Chapter 
II. The discussion then turns to the party’s perspective and influence on more recent 
maritime security related issues pertaining to bilateralism and multilateralism, as 
indicated by policy tied to ballistic missile defense and antipiracy operations.  
1. Origins and Background: LDP Structure and Ideology 
Before the elections of 2009 and the arrival of the DPJ, the LDP had been the 
dominant ruling party of Japan (barring a brief period in the early 1990s) since its 
founding in 1955. The result of a merger between two smaller conservative parties at the 
time,54 the LDP was the face of Japanese domestic politics. From a structural perspective, 
it is worth noting that factionalism and politically influential party members have been 
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important factors of the LDP. Factionalism has been prevalent since the party’s inception, 
and “[many] observers of postwar Japanese politics identify persistent factionalism as the 
most important organizational attribute of the… Liberal Democratic Party.”55 Likewise, 
influential party members carried their own incentives and influenced the party’s agenda 
throughout the years. However, structure is not the only important aspect of the party 
worthy of discussion. 
Ideology has also been important to the party’s dominance, perhaps more so than 
its structure. Without breaking down LDP ideology in its entirety, an argument can easily 
be made that the party’s ideology had to evolve over time and consider a range of issues 
to sustain its dominance through the years. As such, the LDP portrayed itself and its 
ideology in a manner that made it “a giant catchall party during its hegemony.”56 With 
this understanding of party ideology, it stands to reason that the LDP addressed security 
concerns and policy only when such issues were at the forefront of domestic politics. 
With this simplified understanding of the LDP, the argument could be furthered 
that the structural balance within the LDP and the nature of its ideology during its period 
of rule were a microcosm of what was determined to be of political importance to the 
country, and reflect the efforts of the party to remain in power. This argument builds 
upon the discussion from Chapter II, and further contextualizes the role of domestic 
structure and parties in shaping security policy amidst the role and influence of broader 
societal norms (constructivism) and external factors (realist concerns). Considering this, 
it is easier to understand the LDPs views of the security environment, and the party’s role 
in the formation and implementation of security policy. 
2. LDP Views of the Security Environment and Influence on Policy 
Having briefly summarized the LDP and its priorities during its years in power, 
the discussion can now turn to the party’s view of the security environment, in particular 
during the post-Cold War years, and interpreting its ability to influence security policy in 
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more recent years. However, in the interest of continuity, a brief outline of LDPs views 
and influence on security policy in the period leading up to the post-Cold War years is 
provided. 
The best approach to summarizing the LDPs views and influence in the realm of 
security policy leading up to the post-Cold War era is to combine Gerald L. Curtis’ 
phased outline of LDP rule57 with significant security related events that occurred during 
each phase similar to those raised in Chapter II. This combination is useful for a number 
of reasons. First, in the interest of brevity, it allows a significant portion of LDP rule to be 
covered quickly. Second, Curtis’ phased outline accounts for some of the opposition the 
LDP had to face, which is further useful in contextualizing the party’s interests and role 
in security related matters of the period.  
a. Phase One 
Phase one of this discussion covers LDP rule from its founding in 1955 to 
the mid-sixties, as delineated by Curtis. During this phase, the contentious nature of the 
domestic climate was closely tied to Japan’s security environment. The party was 
opposed by an ideologically left-leaning Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), which sought to 
hinder the LDP’s “objective of overturning the constitutional order established during the 
American Occupation.”58 This is a fairly clear example of a time the LDP had readily 
identifiable views and a desire to alter the nature of Japan’s security policy and 
environment. Another example pertaining to the security relationship with the United 
States that arose during this time was the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty of 1960. The 
question then becomes whether or not the party was in fact capable of influencing 
security policy in either of the two instances. 
In the case of the overturning constitutional order, the LDP sought such 
action based on the notion that “if Japan [was] to be truly independent, it must have the 
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power to defend itself,”59 which is hindered by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. 
Efforts to alter Article 9 were impeded and have been routinely opposed by political 
opposition to the LDP, which highlights the limited impact the party had in influencing 
this security policy during this period. A similar conclusion could be reached in assessing 
the security treaty of 1960. While the treaty was passed, and could be construed as a 
victory for the LDP in influencing security policy, the circumstances of the treaty’s 
ratification paint a starkly different picture. The passing of the treaty had more to do with 
governmental gridlock than effective political campaigning on the part of the LDP, as it 
faced tremendous governmental opposition from the JSP, and publicly, from portions of 
society advocating neutralism. These examples suggest a constrained ability on the part 
of the LDP during this period to influence security policy in support of its overarching 
views. However, that is not to suggest the party viewed security related success in terms 
of simply being able to revise Article 9. 
Taking into account the constructivist and realist arguments from Chapter 
II, a balance was certainly struck between addressing domestic norms and external 
threats. With this perspective, it could be argued that although the party did not succeed 
in revising Article 9, and despite difficulty in passing the 1960 treaty, the LDP was able 
to operate within a constrained political environment in a manner that best served its 
political needs and the security needs of the nation. In the aftermath of this period, the 
party still maintained power, and the country had established a reliable bilateral 
relationship with the United States that did more to enhance its security environment. 
b. Phase Two 
The second phase to be analyzed ranges from the mid-sixties to the late 
1970s, as indicated by Curtis. This period is characterized by the rise in the number of 
opposition parties, as well as a decline in overall support for the LDP. Despite the 
increased competition, the LDP was able to maintain its hold on government, as “the 
inability of any of the new challengers to develop into anything more than minor 
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parties… [helped] the LDP retain power by fragmenting opposition to it.”60 Regardless, 
in trying to understand the security related views and influence of the LDP during the 
period, this dynamic is not seemingly conducive for a majority party to act unilaterally on 
any issue, let alone those dealing with security. Therefore, the discussion must turn to the 
security policies that emerged during this phase to identify better the LDPs views and 
influence at the time. 
Two important and related events pertaining to Japan’s security 
environment and associated policy occurred during this period, which offer some insight 
into the views and influence of the LDP. The first is the Nixon Doctrine, and the second 
is the NDPO of 1976. Looking back at the security environment and policy outlined in 
phase one, the Nixon Doctrine had significant implications for Japan’s relationship and 
reliance on the United States, “and seemed to define an American response of foreign 
policy retrenchment,”61 during this time. The 1976 NDPO aimed to address this 
significant change in Japan’s security environment. Sparing the details, the NDPO called 
for a defense buildup in lieu of U.S. presence and support. Recalling the constructivist 
argument on behalf of prevalent pacifist, anti-militarist norms across Japanese society, 
the NDPO “met with surprisingly little public resistance.”62 Given its status as the ruling 
party, this incident seemingly illustrates an instance in which the LDP was able to 
influence security policy based on its views. However, it is important to acknowledge 
that this policy was passed amidst significant changes in Japan’s security environment, as 
well as during a time when the party itself was in relative decline, which made it difficult 
to argue that the changes were a result of the influence of the LDP.  
Once more, the balance between the influence of parties, norms, and 
external factors helps to explain this dynamic. While the LDP was instrumental in the 
passing of the NDPO, the importance of external threats cannot be dismissed as a driving 
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factor behind its passing as well. Although the constructivist argument would suggest the 
NDPO should not have passed given pacifist societal norms, the country as whole had to 
consider the prospects of being helpless against the communist threat of the period, 
especially in the potential absence of U.S. presence as the Nixon Doctrine had indicated.  
c. Phase Three 
The final phase of the Cold War era spans from the late 1970s to the war’s 
end in the early 1990s. Turning once more to Curtis’ discussion of LDP rule, this period 
is characterized by the party’s consolidation of power against domestic opposition along 
with “a continuing decline in ideological polarization.”63 While some projected the rise 
of security and defense minded individuals, and subsequently, more hawkish policies,64 
the party factionalism, structure, and individuals previously outlined remained, as well as 
the need to cater to a broad swath of society to stay in power. This situation speaks to the 
fact that while Japan continued to grow economically, policies and growth pertaining to 
security were limited. LDP leadership and the nature of Japan’s security relationship with 
the United States are indicative of this. 
While some LDP leaders, such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, were hawkish and 
in favor of “a strong, proud, and militarily independent Japan,”65 it was other, more 
dovish LDP leaders, such as Zenko Suzuki, that saw to the renegotiation of the treaty 
with the United States in 1981. While Nakasone, and an arguably more hawkish 
government, would succeed Suzuki as Prime Minister, the terms of the 1981 agreement 
set the tone for Japanese security policy through the end of the Cold War. Degrees of 
expansion were associated with the agreement, such as increased capabilities of the SDF, 
and expansion of Japan’s area of responsibility. However, “due to Japan’s [normative] 
self-defense constraints, increased economic contributions were natural offsets for [an] 
American military guarantee… [after all, even 35 years later], the Occupation 
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Constitution clearly prohibited war potential of any kind.”66 Once more, it is difficult to 
make a case that LDP views and influence during this phase were wholly reflected in the 
security policies of the time. 
The policies that emerged and the role of the LDP during the era of the 
Cold War further the notion that while not entirely irrelevant in the security policy 
process, the party was constrained. In general, this discussion suggests that Japanese 
security policy of the era was shaped as much by a balance between societal constraints, 
and the influence of external events and actors, as the governing party. While the LDP 
was able to consolidate enough power during the period to maintain its hold on the 
domestic system, in the realm of security policy, the party was consistently challenged at 
any given time by the influence of the United States, a looming communist threat, and 
pacifist norms, in addition to waves of political opposition. It is also important to mention 
however, that no single factor was truly able to dominate security policy during the 
period. The end of the Cold War signaled an end to this dynamic. Discussing the post-
Cold War Era offers an opportunity to address these changes, while also lending to a 
more focused discussion of maritime security policy under the LDP and later, the DPJ.   
3. LDP Views and Influence: Post-Cold War Era and Maritime Security 
During the Cold War years, Japan navigated the security environment by keeping 
close ties to the United States. The role of the LDP in the relatively consistent policy 
decision-making process of the period has been identified. However, in the absence of the 
monolithic communist threat, the security environment in the post-Cold War era has been 
no less dynamic for Japan and the LDP, which provided greater depth to the discussion of 
the party’s views and influence on security policy, and a more detailed foundation for 
comparison against the recently elected DPJ. The most important overarching theme in 
this section for understanding the LDPs views and influence in the post-Cold War era 
pertains to the new generation of leaders that emerged in 2001, and is outlined by Richard 
Samuels:  
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Rather than focus on their elders’ traditional issues of defense technology, 
budgets, and equipment procurement, this group urged Japan to “defend 
its national interest based upon ‘realism’”. They had the unqualified 
support of young conservatives… not to mention the support of the United 
States.67 
However, just as it was difficult to outline the views and influence of the LDP during the 
Cold War era, the same can be said for the post-Cold War period. Therefore, keeping in 
mind Samuels’ description, the discussion unfolds as follows. First, although some 
analysis is drawn from the period of the 1990s, emphasis is placed on Japan’s security 
environment and policies to emerge following the September 11 attacks. Second, the 
discussion begins to focus on two aspects of security policy for Japan, each involving the 
maritime realm, BMD and antipiracy.    
a. The United States and Ballistic Missile Defense 
An understanding of the party views and influence on security policy 
alluded to by Samuels in the post-Cold War period can begin with an analysis of Japan’s 
continued bilateral ties with the United States as evidenced in its BMD policy. The issue 
of bilateralism with the United States has existed since the end of World War II, and 
BMD predates the end of the Cold War, with its origins in the United States Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s.  Using the period of the 1980s as a starting point, 
rhetoric from Prime Minister Nakasone at the time suggested Japan continued to support 
its alliance with the United States, as well as the SDI. However, following the end of the 
Cold War, significant debate occurred over how Japan should proceed in the security 
environment in general, and it was not until missile tests by the DPRK in 1998 that Japan 
“agreed to undertake joint research with the United States on what was then called 
‘theater missile defense’.”68 Participation was limited in nature. A 2001 RAND report 
indicated that problems for Japan associated with developing BMD with the United 
States stemmed from costs, legality, and regional relationships.69 These issues weighed 
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heavily on LDP leadership at the time, namely the Prime Ministers, who “[continued] to 
adopt a relatively cautious stance on BMD, absent an immediate threat to Japan’s 
security.”70 However, the September 11 attacks, followed by events in subsequent years, 
had a significant impact on the LDP and Japan, and its outlook on the alliance and BMD.  
The September 11 attack itself was an important event for Japan’s bilateral 
relationship with the United States. In the aftermath of the attack, Prime Minister 
Koizumi expressed support to the United States. While this act of solidarity was more in 
support of the war on terror and did little to further development of BMD at the time, it 
was of importance in the long run for two reasons. First and foremost, it reinforced the 
“realist” approach emerging in the LDP as outlined by Samuels, and strengthened the 
bilateral relationship with the United States. Secondly, along the lines of terrorist threats, 
and in conjunction with the United States, Japan came to identify the DPRK as a source 
of angst and a threat to the security environment. Subsequent action on the part of the 
DPRK including continued testing of ballistic missiles, and withdrawal from the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty furthered this notion, and emphasis was placed on the 
importance of BMD. Whereas security policy was arguably derived from the influence of 
norms and external factors during the era of the Cold War, more so than party views and 
influence, this situation is an example of a time when party views and influence had 
become incrementally more relevant in the process of forming and implementing security 
policy.  
Examples of the increased role of LDP views and influence in shaping 
security policy are evident in the development of the BMD program.  For example, under 
Prime Minister Koizumi, action taken by the party brought into question the effectiveness 
of the arms export ban, as “the Koizumi government declared that the BMD project 
would be excluded from nonexport principles… [and] reserved the right to relax 
restrictions in future cases other than those related to missile defense.”71 Likewise, LDP 
influence is further evidenced by the party’s introduction of the Basic Law for Space 
Activities, which legitimized the development of space technologies that directly support 
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BMD, and shifted the interpretation of the “peaceful” use of space to “permitting the use 
of space for ‘defensive’ [military] purposes.”72 These examples, however, do not 
diminish the importance of domestic norms or external factors in Japan, as the LDP did 
not eliminate their influence in shaping security policy. Although the party arguably 
sought to develop the program sooner, it still had to navigate a historically pacifist 
society for a number of years: 
Insisting that the entire effort was only research and stopped short of 
system development, the Japanese government bought three additional 
years to evaluate its technological options and, more important, to develop 
a political strategy to sell collaborative missile defense with the United 
States.73 
Similarly, the role of external factors cannot be dismissed. For example, concerning the 
United States: 
[one] cannot deny that the policies and actions of the United States – as a 
strong advocate of BMD systems, as the only alliance partner upon whom 
Tokyo depends greatly for its security, and as a provider of military forces 
based on Japanese territory – also greatly influence Japanese perspectives 
and calculations.74 
Also, central to the discussion of BMD is the external threat from the DPRK. While this 
discussion of bilateralism and BMD in the post-Cold War era contextualizes the role and 
relative influence of the LDP, an analysis of party views and influence regarding 
multilateralism and antipiracy provides further depth, and highlights the complexity of 
the security environment since the end of the Cold War.  
b. Antipiracy 
In the context of the Cold War, security policies geared toward 
multilateralism may have taken a back seat to the assurances found in Japan’s bilateral 
relationship with the United States. An effort to pursue such relationships still existed, 
with “Japan’s interest in and support for strong multilateral arrangements [dating] back to 
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the 1960s.”75 With the end of the Cold War and the dynamic nature of the security 
environment, Japan’s pursuit of multilateral arrangements has perhaps become more 
apparent. One important example of this has occurred in the realm of antipiracy. Being an 
island nation, a desire to mitigate the threat of piracy makes sense for Japan, as security 
of sea lines of communication (SLOC) are critical to the nation’s economy. As a result, 
while the LDP was still the ruling party, conferences were routinely held to address the 
issue, illustrating its importance to the party.76 While emphasis was initially centered on 
“[developing] a regional antipiracy agreement,”77 more recent events in the HOA region 
expanded the party’s interest to partake in a multilateral effort. 
As the number of piracy incidents increased in the HOA region, Japan’s 
Ministry of Defense took the necessary steps to dispatch forces to support maritime 
security operations. Even though the force was small in number, a critical element 
reinforcing a desire for multilateralism was seen in the minister’s instructions, which 
called for “coordination with the Government of Djibouti, U.S. Forces, and related 
organizations.”78 While this issuance of instruction was being executed, debate over what 
was legally appropriate action for deployed MSDF assets arose. The LDP, as represented 
by Prime Minister Taro Aso at the time, argued “that the use of weapons against pirates, 
who are criminals, does not constitute a military action as prohibited by the 
Constitution,”79 and in turn, passed a contentious antipiracy bill that expanded the rules 
of engagement and “[authorized] the Self Defense Forces to protect any commercial ship 
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from pirates, regardless of a Japanese connection.”80 These efforts on the part of the LDP 
highlight the party’s views and influence on what has become an important maritime 
security issue.  
It is important to note that in the new security environment of the post- 
Cold War era, the dynamic among the influential factors (societal norms, external events 
and influences, and the party) shifted. The role and influence of the party in issues during 
the Cold War period may not have been prominent, but the new security environment, 
particularly after September 11, afforded the LDP “an opportunity to achieve policies it 
had long wanted to pursue but believed to be impossible.”81 This new environment sets 
the stage for discussing the DPJ, and the role and influence it may have in Japan’s future 
security environment, as reflected in the maritime security issues above.   
B. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN 
Before DPJ influence on maritime security policy relative to the LDP can be 
determined, a similar outline of the party’s origins and background must be provided. 
This serves the purpose of identifying structural and ideological differences the party may 
have with the LDP, and lends to some expectations of where points of departure on 
maritime security policy may exist between the two parties. An assessment of whether or 
not these expectations hold true is saved for the next chapter, and the discussion now 
turns to the DPJs history.   
1. Origins and Background: DPJ Structure and Ideology  
The Democratic Party of Japan is relatively new to Japan’s domestic political 
scene, emerging in 1998 as another opposition party to the LDP. Reason exists to assume 
that its nature as an opposition party is useful to identifying its ideologies at the very 
least, but consideration must also be given to its structure as well. The party was a 
product of merging factions that had split from the LDP. In that sense, the party has a 
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similar core structure to the LDP, forming “as a consequence of a merger of formerly 
independent parties.”82 At the time of its formation, the joining of these parties was 
centered on “reform-minded politicians… with the aim of establishing a genuine 
opposition force capable of taking power from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP).”83 However, the same limitations and constraints experienced by the LDP in its 
early years were evident in the case of the DPJ, as factionalism, strong minded 
individuals and interest based politics limited the party’s overall impact on the political 
scene in the years leading up to 2009.  
Factionalism in the DPJ alone can account for many of the hurdles the party had 
to overcome on its way to winning the 2009 elections. Whereas the LDP was a product of 
conservative parties joining together, Patrick Kollner states that the DPJ “proved to be 
much more heterogeneous.” As a result, a variety of perspectives, both conservative and 
liberal in nature, on a range of issues did much to challenge party cohesiveness within the 
DPJ. For every challenge factionalism presented the party, party leadership was able to 
keep the DPJ from disintegrating. Unlike the importance of seniority in the LDP, which 
determined the positions and posts to which the party members had access, DPJ 
leadership took strides to distribute important positions among the different factions in an 
effort to keep the party together.84 Although these structural characteristics may not have 
been conducive to maintaining a formidable opposition party, let alone defeating the 
LDP, the DPJ has been able to overcome them. The discussion can now shift to the DPJs 
ideology, with particular emphasis on the party’s views on security policy.  
Reviewing the DPJ during its opposition years, the party certainly attempted to 
identify itself as “left” of where the LDP was on a range of issues. This view was no less 
different for security policy. In 1998, the DPJ outlined a basic philosophy that included 
commentary on security issues: 
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We shall embody the fundamental principles of the Constitution: popular 
sovereignty, respect for fundamental human rights, and pacifism. Finally, 
as a member of the global community, we shall establish international 
relations in the fraternal spirit of self-reliance and mutual coexistence, and 
thereby restore the world’s trust in Japan.85 
This basic philosophy was followed up with a party outline of basic security policies, 
which offered more concrete examples of party ideology. The document highlighted the 
DPJs recognition of the evolving security environment in the post-Cold War era, 
reinforces pacifist tendencies, stresses greater autonomy, understands the importance of 
the security alliance with the United States, and lastly, calls for greater multilateralism 
across the region even in dealing with the United Nations, all in an effort to “[ensure] an 
active Japanese contribution to building world peace.”86 These policies cast an arguably 
wider net compared to the LDP, and certainly stress pacifist tendencies and varying 
degrees of security independence for Japan. However, Kollner indicates that despite the 
ideological differences between the parties on the surface, “[the] DPJ’s absorption of a 
number of center-right groups… certainly did not make the party more homogeneous in 
terms of the policy positions held.”87 This point is revisited in the next chapter, but using 
the policy differences outlined above, some expected points of departure regarding the 
previously discussed maritime security policies could be offered. 
2. Expected Points of Departure with the LDP 
Prior to assessing whether the DPJ is in fact willing and/or able to shift aspects of 
maritime security policy, and in turn, broader security policy, it is important to identify 
what might be expected from the party based on its broader security policy outline. 
a. The United States and BMD 
Reason may exist to believe the DPJ might drag its feet on BMD policy 
that furthers the program along. At first glance, the program seems counterintuitive to the 
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party’s initial policy statements that echo pacifism and enhance a peaceful global 
environment. The statement in the party’s Defense Policy Principles that maintains, 
“Japan will adhere to the three principles of arms exports”, supports this stance.88 If the 
party adheres to this statement, it would contradict the LDP’s efforts to modify arms 
export bans as it saw fit to develop the BMD program, as well as diminish the strength of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance in favor of promoting its original security policy objectives 
outlined above. 
b. Antipiracy 
With respect to multilateral efforts and antipiracy, perhaps reason does 
exist to believe the DPJ would at the very least support if not expand on current policy. 
Supporting the antipiracy effort abroad is certainly based in “defense-oriented policy,” 
and enhances positive relations for Japan outside of its bilateral relationship with the 
United States. Issues obviously worthy of further discussion as the nature of rules of 
engagement for the MSDF in support of antipiracy operations have been debated, but at 
first glance, it would seem that this aspect of maritime security policy builds upon the 
DPJ broader policy platform. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The focus of this chapter was to discuss the role of parties in the security policy-
making process, further contextualizing their influence relative to other factors pertaining 
to international relations theories, while introducing elements of maritime security policy 
to further the discussion and serve as a point for discussing the recent changes in 
domestic structure. Taking the insights from this chapter regarding structural and 
ideological differences between the LDP and the DPJ, as well as the experience of the 
LDP in both the broader and maritime security policy-making process during its years as 
the dominant party, the discussion can now shift to an analysis of what changes, if at all, 
under the DPJ as reflected in the specific maritime security policy realms outlined above. 
The next chapter discusses in greater detail the current state of BMD and antipiracy, and 
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addresses the expectations and assumptions for the DPJ on these policy issues as raised in 
the last section, all in an effort to determine the impact of the recent election on Japanese 
maritime security and broader security policy.  
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IV. BMD AND ANTIPIRACY UNDER THE DPJ 
This chapter begins by focusing on the current disposition and critical elements of 
the MSDF regarding BMD and antipiracy, along with recent policies tied to these 
elements of maritime security. Once the policies have been identified, the discussion 
turns to the role the DPJ has had in influencing and implementing relevant maritime 
security policy, particularly since coming to power in 2009. This focus is an effort to 
further the discussion regarding the role of parties in security policy formation relative to 
normative and external factors, as well as to determine whether initial assessments made 
in Chapter III regarding the positions of the DPJ are in fact correct. Recalling the initial 
assessments from Chapter III, based on the structure and ideology of the DPJ relative to 
the LDP, the expectation is that policy tied to BMD will serve as a point of departure for 
the DPJ, while efforts will be made to expand policy regarding antipiracy. 
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF BMD AND ANTIPIRACY 
Prior to assessing the role and influence the DPJ has had in BMD and antipiracy, 
it is important to outline the current state of BMD and antipiracy. An understanding of 
the current disposition and critical elements of the MSDF in support of these two 
elements of maritime security offers insight regarding what the country has been willing 
to commit to each mission area in the interest of enhancing the security environment. A 
second important aspect to this discussion also identifies recent policy that has 
contributed to the evolution of BMD and antipiracy to date. This viewpoint will serve as 
a baseline for determining whether the current state and policies of each mission area are 
aligned with the expectations for the DPJ mentioned above, as well as later discussing the 
influence and contributions of the DPJ in shaping not only these aspects of maritime 
security, but broader security policy as well.  
1. MSDF: Contribution to BMD 
Many components to Japan’s BMD architecture exist, to include land, sea, and 
space based systems. This section focuses solely on those components attributed to the 
MSDF, and its support of the larger, layered BMD architecture, beginning with the sea 
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based platforms to be used. Four MSDF Kongo-class Aegis destroyers89 were to be 
outfitted by the end of 2010 “with a Standard Missile-3 Block IA (SM-3 BLK IA) from 
the [United States].”90 It is the assumption of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) that at any 
given time, “the entire territory can be defended by two to three Aegis BMD ships,” 
serving as midcourse interceptors.91 However, the systems on these platforms serve only 
to deliver the second, and arguably, more critical components of the sea based BMD 
program.  
In addition to outfitting the four MSDF Aegis destroyers, the maritime component 
of the BMD program relies heavily on the continued improvement of the SM-3. The SM-
3 is a unique component of Aegis, and the MOD has identified further development of 
the SM-3 as critical to the program, as the ministry, “aims to improve future capabilities 
of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan’s national 
defense.”92 This combination of platform and delivery system represent the current force 
composition of the MSDF in support of Japan’s BMD program, but it is important to 
address their effectiveness as well.  
The final aspect of understanding the current disposition of the MSDF in support 
of BMD, is addressing the successful testing of the system. On December 17, 2007, the 
first BMD outfitted ship, JDS Kongo, successfully completed an operational test of the 
system.93 Since then, three more tests have been completed, which highlights the 
effectiveness of the platform and delivery system in detecting, tracking, and eliminating a 
ballistic missile threat. While this identifies the current state of the MSDF and its efforts 
to support BMD, it is also important to outline the recent maritime security policy tied to 
BMD that has influenced the MSDF. 
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2. Recent Maritime Security Policy Tied to BMD 
Given the multifaceted nature of Japan’s BMD architecture, it is difficult to say 
that policy tied to the program is in the interest of maritime security alone. However, the 
policies do influence the maritime component and MSDF, and therefore, must be 
discussed. Among the most important policy considerations associated with BMD are 
collective security and the importance of the bilateral relationship with the United States, 
the defense budget, and arms exportation controls.  
a. Collective Security and Bilateralism 
Some of the policies tied to BMD have dealt with matters of collective 
security and the bilateral relationship with the United States. Christopher Hughes 
addresses some of the possibilities and concerns associated with collective security: 
Japan’s closer cooperation with the [United States], and possession of an 
Aegis BMD system largely interoperable with that of the [United States], 
is likely to increase U.S. expectation that Japan will deploy these assets in 
support of U.S. and multinational coalitions outside its territory … There 
are also expectations [the system] should function if necessary for the 
defense not just of Japan but also of the U.S. homeland.94 
While some may have taken issue with the decision to pursue an 
integrated BMD architecture with the United States given the implications for collective 
security, Japanese leadership adopted a policy stance arguing that “the system the 
Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan… and will not be used for 
the purpose of defending third countries.”95 However, this has not prevented additional 
policy addressing continued bilateralism with the United States as evidenced by the SM-3 
Cooperative Development Project (SCD). The SCD centers on the effort “to develop 
Advanced SM-3 [missiles] for ballistic missile defense making the most of the cutting 
edge technologies of the U.S. and Japan.”96 This SCD also has policy implications for 
Japan’s arms exportation rules, which is discussed in more detail below. 
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b. Budgetary Policy 
The cost of the BMD program has had significant implications for Japan’s 
defense budget. As a result, certain policy decisions have had to be made regarding the 
cost of pursuing the program versus maintaining the cap on defense spending. With this 
in mind, Richard Samuels emphasizes that in 2004, “the development phase alone would 
cost $8-$10 billion over five years, and Japan had agreed to pay one-third.”97 To this day, 
continued research and development in BMD is expected to cost Japan approximately 
half a billion dollars,98 which includes funding for enhanced SM-3 BLK IIA BMD 
interceptor missiles. These costs have forced decision makers to prioritize defense 
programs, in an effort to keep to the budgetary cap.  
c. Arms Exportation 
Arms exportation has also been subject to policy revisions based on the 
implementation of the BMD program. Directly related to the SCD mentioned above, the 
continued development and improvement of the SM-3 with the United States has called 
for “Japanese-developed components… to be transferred to U.S. partners.”99 This 
development reflects a departure from previous arms exportation policy under the Three 
Principles of Arms Exports from 1967, namely the third that prevented exportation to 
“countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.”100 
3. MSDF: Contribution to Antipiracy 
Securing SLOCs continues to be important to Japan. While the waters of 
Southeast Asia have been at the forefront of Japan’s antipiracy efforts since the beginning 
of last decade, increased piracy in the HOA region in recent years has led to an increased 
Japanese presence further away from the home islands. On March 14, 2009, two MSDF 
Destroyers, DD Sazanami and DD Samidare, departed Japan for the waters off the HOA, 
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and began routine escorts of merchant vessels two weeks later.101 This operation has 
been sustained since, with the MOD releasing monthly activity updates that reflect the 
number of ships escorted by MSDF ships. It is also important to note that MSDF ships 
have coordinated with other UN ships in the region, shared information and used organic 
helicopter assets to support the multilateral antipiracy effort.102 However, the ability of 
MSDF assets to operate in such a manner during these operations has been the result of 
adopting new security policy. 
4. Recent Security Policy Tied to Antipiracy 
As the number of piracy incidents increased in 2008, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) issued statements that supported UN efforts to quell pirate activity, and 
reiterated the importance of SLOCs to Japan: 
Japan has been gravely concerned about the acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan regards 
this issue as an urgent matter from the point of view of ensuring the safety 
of sea lanes as well as of protecting the lives and assets of our nationals. 
Against this backdrop, Japan held close consultations with Security 
Council members for the adoption of this resolution and joined in its co-
sponsorship. Japan strongly hopes that the resolution will enhance the 
ongoing efforts to address the issue of piracy and armed robbery in this 
area.103 
Three months later, MSDF assets were on station and actively involved in antipiracy 
operations. However, initially deployed under the premise of a police action, these forces 
were limited to protecting only Japanese merchant vessels or those vessels with Japanese 
nationals or cargo onboard. Policymakers would debate and enact a separate law known 
as the Anti-Piracy Measures Law that has “established punitive provisions for such acts 
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[of piracy] while also stipulating among other things the expansion of protection to 
vessels of all countries,”104 as well as allow MSDF ships to “use force not only for self-
defense but also to compel pirate vessels to halt if no other reasonable means is 
available.”105 
B. ROLE OF THE DPJ IN BMD AND ANTIPIRACY 
The current state of Japan’s BMD and antipiracy efforts and policies outlined 
above provide a basis for discussing the role of the DPJ in shaping both realms of 
maritime security. This discussion first seeks to identify whether the party’s policy 
perspectives on BMD and antipiracy have differed at all from those of the LDP, and 
second, addresses its influence on relevant policy relative to normative and external 
factors previously mentioned since the party’s rise to power in 2009.  
1. BMD: DPJ vs. LDP 
The subject of BMD in Japan is highly useful for comparing the policy 
perspectives of the DPJ and LDP, since it has been an important issue dating back to 
when the DPJ first formed in 1998. As a result, an opportunity exists to analyze the DPJ’s 
policy outlook on the issue as both an opposition party, as well as since coming to power. 
The policy issues outlined under the discussion of BMD above are used as a basis of 
comparing the two parties. 
a. Collective Security and Bilateralism 
Collective security and bilateralism are two policy issues that have 
certainly been part of the BMD debate, and their sensitive nature resulted in a cautionary 
approach on the part of Japanese leaders for a number of years prior to committing to the 
BMD program fully. As for collective security, while the LDP was in power, it was 
evident that policy statements had to be routinely made, which suggested the BMD 
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system was “ a inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and only measure to 
protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan”106 against ballistic missiles. This 
statement was made despite the prospects that integration of Japan into the system was a 
useful tool for the United States in engaging intercontinental ballistic missiles, which 
potentially involved the island nation in collective security. As the project proceeded, 
LDP leaders eventually addressed the issue head on with statements that stressed the 
system was solely for the purpose of defending Japan: 
“[It] does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of 
collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles 
by Japan’s own independent judgment based on the information on the 
target acquired by Japan’s own sensors.”107   
However, while these statements were being issued that suggested Japan 
was acting independently in its pursuit of BMD, it was quite apparent that implementing 
a viable system relied heavily on the country’s bilateral relationship with the United 
States. The same statements by the LDP suggested that independent defense would also 
echo bilateral sentiments, “promoting further cooperation with the United States on 
technology and operation.”108 This cooperation has since been evidenced by the SCD, as 
the two nations jointly continue to research and improve SM-3 interceptor technology. 
Meanwhile, in the midst of these statements and the developmental and 
research phase, the DPJ was emerging as an opposition party. Leaders within the party 
acknowledged the issues of BMD, and given the party’s basic security policies, it might 
be expected that the DPJ would have voiced opposition to the program. This opposition is 
supported in the party’s Basic Policies on Security document that outlines defense policy 
principles, one of which was “Japan will not exercise the right to collective self-
defense… [a principle that] should continue to be respected.”109 The same document also  
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challenges the nature of the bilateral relationship with the United States, and calls for 
greater autonomy on the part of the Japan. However, with time, it seems as though the 
party has acquiesced to the policies and structure of the BMD program. 
While some of the DPJ leadership expressed reservations with the BMD 
program, others, although cautious, were willing to undertake the effort. One individual, 
Yukio Hatoyama, who would later become the party’s first Prime Minister after winning 
the 2009 elections, is among the DPJ leaders willing as early as 2000 to concede to 
implementing the system and its implications, “[going] on record saying he could support 
Japan’s participation in collective defense.”110 The further along the program proceeded, 
the more it seemed the DPJ backed the effort. Samuels indicates, “[the] strategic 
importance of jointly developing BMD had overridden differences… and had received 
widespread support from LDP and DPJ politicians.”111 That is not to sell short the 
internal debate within the DPJ on the issue. One article in late 2009 highlights that “one 
DPJ Lower House member and DPJ deputy spokesmen urged the new government to 
eliminate BMD altogether.”112 The same article continues to describe that the foreign 
minister at the time, Katsuya Okada, had not been entirely supportive of the program; 
however, the program’s successful testing and collaboration with the United States were 
enough to have seemingly quelled some of the concerns within the party that may have 
stemmed from the issue of collective security. These examples are disconfirming to the 
notion that the DPJ would be against continued development of BMD once it came to 
power in 2009. Other policy aspects to BMD further this reality. 
b. Budgetary Policy 
The costs associated with implementing the BMD system have been at the 
forefront of defense budgetary issues since the late 1990s. During the DPJ’s early years, 
Hatoyama again was among the leaders to offer an opinion on the matter, which suggests 
the cost of the program could be to the detriment of Japan, “providing technology and 
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money to the United States but gaining nothing worthwhile in return.”113 This budgetary 
perspective on the costs of BMD contributes to the notion that the system would serve as 
a point of departure between the DPJ and LDP. However, turning again to the DPJ’s 
Basic Policies on Security, it would appear that the party has had more in common with 
the LDP in the long run on the issue of BMD.  
The DPJ’s Basic Policies on Security from 1999 address the defense 
budget in the context of arms procurement. The document recommended adopting a 
defense budget that addresses realistic threats to Japan, instead of what had been “the 
traditional approach whereby equal priority is given to the Ground, Maritime, and Air 
SDF.”114 This call for the prioritization of defense programs and budgeting alludes to 
concerns regarding Japan’s fiscal deficit, which had become “the largest in the industrial 
world”115 by the time the LDP decided to embrace the program. However, at this point, 
where it might be assumed the LDP implemented the program with reckless abandon and 
in complete disregard of the one percent defense-spending cap, the opposite occurred. 
Along the lines of the DPJ’s Basic Policies on Security, then LDP Prime Minister 
Koizumi: 
…insisted instead on restructuring Japan’s defense force posture … [and 
the] uniformed services would have to get used to the idea that the 
political leadership was no longer content simply to supervise a “shopping 
ministry.”116 
This policy outcome once more runs counterintuitive to what might be 
expected, as the DPJ and LDP again arrived at a similar policy conclusion in pursuit of 
BMD. Again, this is not to suggest that internal debate did not occur for the DPJ, as the 
Asian Times article from 2009 states that party members in the House of Representatives, 
such as Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi, “objected strongly to a request for more than a 50% 
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increase in missile defense-related expenditures in [the 2010] budget.”117 However, it 
would seem that a degree of alignment between the parties regarding the best approach to 
spending money, coupled with the idea that despite the costliness of the program it has 
had positive results, has again been enough to overcome any concerns within the DPJ, as 
it has done little to suggest it will not see the program through to fruition.  
c. Arms Exportation 
The final policy realm of BMD to be discussed is that of arms exportation. 
Like collective security and budgetary issues, the DPJ’s perspective on arms exportation 
was originally outlined in the party’s Basic Policies on Security document; and like 
collective security, it was the belief of the party that the three principles of arms exports 
were to be upheld and respected. However, the circumstances involving BMD and arms 
exportation have again shown the DPJ to be more aligned with the LDP than might be 
expected. 
As a reminder, the SCD calls for the transfer of Japanese developed SM-3 
components to the United States as part of the joint effort to research and improve 
interceptor technology continuously. It was announced by the Koizumi administration 
that such activity “[in support of] the BMD project would be excluded from non-export 
principles.”118 Using the most literal interpretation of the DPJ’s Basic Policies of 
Security, such activity would be in violation of the third principle of arms exports. 
However, that possible violation has not prevented the party from supporting BMD 
related exports in the past, nor has it been the case since the party’s rise to power.  
The arms export issue has been recently raised with respect to continued 
system development and expanding the transfer of BMD beyond Japan and the United 
States to other countries, particularly in Europe. The DPJ-led government initially stated 
it could not support such activity, as “Japan’s current self-imposed ban on arms exports 
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in principle prohibits exporting weapons or weapons-related technology.”119  Some have 
argued, however, that as the prospect arose that the United States might forgo Japanese 
approval if need be, the DPJ was forced to recognize “BMD [as] the #1 security mission 
[for Japan],”120 the importance of the United States to the program, and consider relaxing 
the arms export principles. Combined with the DPJ’s unexpected policy stance on other 
BMD related issues (even as the party in power), the discussion turns to analyzing what 
may have influenced BMD policy in terms of societal norms and external factors.  
2. BMD: The Influence of Normative and External Factors 
Having determined that the DPJ and LDP have had more in common to date on 
the issue of BMD than might be expected, perhaps, other influential factors must be 
identified in an effort to explain this dynamic and the BMD policies that have emerged. 
Holding to the theme of comparing the influence of parties against that of societal norms 
and external factors, the discussion turns to identifying their role and influence on Japan’s 
decision to implement a BMD system.  
a. Societal Norms and BMD 
Recalling that when discussing societal norms and security in Japan, they 
have for the most part, been pacifist in nature, the question becomes whether such pacifist 
tendencies have influenced BMD policy. Prior to determining their influence, a pacifist 
argument is presented. The heart of the argument suggests that if Japan implements a 
BMD system, the potential exists that North Korea (or China) could be provoked into 
“[increasing] the size and sophistication of their missile forces capable of reaching 
Japan.”121 This logic is supported by an issue raised by Samuels, who in describing the 
system, states the possibility exists for the “acquisition of preemptive capabilities that 
would target North Korean missiles prior to launch,”122 which could be further 
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interpreted as an offensive capability for Japan; the next logical step for North Korea 
would be to improve its offensive weapons. Given the argument and information at hand, 
it might be perceived that a generally pacifist society would pressure the government into 
avoiding the implementation of BMD and this scenario; however, such views have not 
been prevalent across Japanese society.  
Among the reasons societal norms have not been as influential on BMD 
policies have been the efforts of the Japanese government to ensure the citizens and 
neighboring countries that the system is strictly defensive in nature, as well as the 
influence of external threats. With respect to the defensive nature of the system, the 
government has repeatedly issued statements reflecting such sentiments. For example: 
BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without 
alternatives, to protect the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attack, 
and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy. Therefore, 
it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and 
does not affect the regional stability.123 
Samuels continues to reaffirm the notion that such statements are not only 
intended for neighboring countries, but for the purpose of “[reassuring] the domestic 
population.”124 As far as the domestic population is concerned, these statements seem to 
have served their purpose, as there has been little public outcry against Japan’s BMD 
endeavor and any threat it may pose to pacifism; but government statements are only half 
of the argument against pacifism.  
The role of external threats must also be considered, in addition to 
DPRK’s activity that spawned the project in the first place. Pacifist tendencies may exist, 
but it stands to reason that a populace may reconsider such tendencies in the face of a 
looming threat, especially when pacifism is doing little to improve the situation. 
Regardless of whether or not BMD may have pre-emptive, or even offensive potential, in 
Japan’s case, it is a system that over time is continuing to prove useful against missile 
threats, unlike pacifist rhetoric.  
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b. External Factors and BMD 
The first external factor to consider in BMD is the role of the United 
States, the partner to Japan in the entire process of implementing the system. An analysis 
of U.S. influence begins with its effort to convince Japan to collaborate and research 
BMD, which was no easy task, particularly during the early 1990s, for a number of 
reasons to include issues already been outlined, such as collective defense, arms 
exportation, and costs. However, by the mid-nineties, the United States had convinced 
Japan to partake in a working group and research program that would consider the range 
of issues, and “whether or not [Japan should] cooperate with the United States on… 
development.”125 The observations made as a result of these programs arguably reflect 
the influence of the United States in convincing Japan to pursue BMD, but other aspects 
highlight U.S. influence, namely in terms of addressing the programs costs and continued 
development.  
The considerable amount of funding that has fallen on the shoulders of the 
United States has been another mechanism for influencing Japan to partake in the BMD 
program. Although the costs were considerable to Japan, the fact it was responsible for 
only one-third of the initial development costs was a huge bargaining chip for the United 
States. The United States Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on average has contributed 
over $7 billion annually to the program since 2002,126 just as the collaboration between 
the two countries was really beginning to increase. While the figure represents the 
MDA’s responsibility for funding the entire U.S. missile defense architecture, a large 
portion of the fiscal commitment is allocated to development of the BMD system with 
Japan. It is not a stretch to suggest this figure has factored heavily into Japan’s 
commitment to the program, as reflected in the country’s continued participation in the 
SCD. However, the ability of the United States to influence Japan on BMD has a direct 
correlation to another external factor, which plays heavily into Japan’s BMD policy 
process.  
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The DPRK is the final external factor to be addressed, and has had a 
significant influence on society and the parties, perhaps making it the most influential on 
BMD policy. DPRK influence is evidenced by the lack of willingness on the part of 
Japan to commit fully to developing a BMD system with the United States until 1998. 
That year, the DPRK launched a Taepodong-1 missile through Japanese airspace, 
“[creating] an atmosphere conducive to more open discussion in the Diet about BMD–in 
particular, about joint technical research on the system with the United States.”127 A 
Christmas statement from the Chief Cabinet Secretary at the time capitalized on the 
North Korean launch, reinforcing the notion that BMD was worth considering given the 
threat: 
It should be noted that the Diet resolution of September this year by the 
lower house regarding the ballistic missile launch by North Korea states: 
The Government will take every measure to ensure the safety of the 
people of the nation.128 
Based on the limited approach to collaboration on the part of the Japanese 
government prior to the DPRK launch, it would be difficult to argue that the LDP or 
American influence alone was able to force the issue of BMD, particularly in the face of 
a pacifist society. However, North Korean activity both then and even in more recent 
years, has proven to be not only influential on BMD policy, but on parties and society as 
well.  
Evidence that parties have been influenced by the external DPRK threat 
can be found in the defense budget, and the prioritization of BMD over other defense 
programs, as well as the decision to loosen arms exportation rules in favor of continued 
system development. Likewise, the pacifist perspective that a BMD system might have 
provoked the DPRK was instantly replaced with a public desire “[for protection] against 
North Korean missiles… [and demands for a] virtually leak-proof protection against all 
conceivable types of missile attacks.”129 These examples speak to the influence of 
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external factors (namely the DPRK threat) on the BMD policy decision-making process. 
The discussion now shifts to the second element of maritime security, antipiracy, and 
identifying where the DPJ stands on issue relative to the LDP. 
3. Antipiracy: DPJ vs. LDP 
Although the issue of antipiracy and analysis on differences between the two 
parties might be traced back to Southeast Asia and the turn of the century, the discussion 
centers on Japan’s involvement in the HOA region since 2008, and the passing of the 
Anti-Piracy Measures Law. To reiterate, the expectation regarding antipiracy is that the 
DPJ will uphold if not take further efforts to expand on policy enacted during LDP rule, 
which is based on the notion that to the party, antipiracy activity is grounded in “defense-
oriented policy,” and enhances positive relations with nations other than the United 
States.  
a. Support for MSDF Involvement 
The decision to send assets to the HOA region appears to have had a 
degree of support from the DPJ while it was still the opposition party. However, issue 
was taken with respect to which agency should be used for antipiracy operations. The 
DPJ argued to send Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ships to conduct operations, because at the 
time, “the MSDF [lacked] powers of arrest, whereas the JCG is able to detain and gather 
evidence for the prosecution of pirates.”130 The LDP argued on behalf of sending MSDF 
ships and ultimately, won, and handled the issue by attaching JCG personnel to the 
deployed units. Despite the differing opinion as the opposition party, the DPJ has not 
taken action to reverse the policy of deploying MSDF ships. 
b. DPJ Views on Anti-Piracy Measures Law 
The Anti-Piracy Measures Law was also passed prior to the DPJ coming 
to power. Hughes suggests, “many DPJ members sympathized with the anti-piracy 
cause,” and perhaps supported its passing.131 However, the law was controversial since it 
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expanded the use of force for MSDF assets, and the ability to protect merchant ships of 
any flag. The DPJ did oppose the bill, but once again, since coming to power, the party 
has done little to overturn it. In July 2010, the party “[extended] the MSDF mission… for 
another year, [and even] began studying the possibility of sending MSDF refueling ships 
to support the mission.”132 The latter is an example supporting the expectation that the 
DPJ might expand on LDP efforts, but another example is seen in the decision to 
construct a naval base in Djibouti: 
The facility, intended to boost the fight against Somali pirates preying on 
vital shipping lanes, will be Japan’s first foreign military base since World 
War II.133 
Based on these findings, it would appear the DPJ and LDP hold similar 
perspectives on antipiracy. The possibility also exist, however, that given the success of 
antipiracy efforts in terms of operations, costs, and favorable support, the DPJ considers 
the issue not worth the political capital of overturning. The operation represents only a 
fraction of the funding allocated by the MOD for “Improving the Global Security 
Environment,”134 and accounts for nearly 1800 successful escorted vessels since the start 
of the operation two years ago under the Anti-Piracy Measures Law.135 Again, it may not 
be fruitful for the DPJ to cease such a seemingly successful operation.  
4. Antipiracy: The Influence of Normative and External Factors 
The influence of norms and external factors on antipiracy policy is worth 
considering based on the controversial policies that have emerged and the expanded 
scope of deploying forces overseas. 
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a. Societal Norms and Antipiracy 
Societal norms based on pacifism would argue that the decision to deploy 
MSDF forces and expand their rules of engagement goes beyond self-defense and 
protection of the Japanese people, and runs the risk of setting a new precedent for 
overseas deployments of the SDF. However, similar to BMD, public opinion (a 
reasonable indicator of societal norms) may not holistically reflect such pacifist concerns 
over the issue. In fact, as MSDF ships were being dispatched back in 2009, poll data 
suggested the opposite: 
Recent newspaper polls have shown growing public support for the anti-
piracy mission, with a survey this week by the top-selling Yomiuri 
Shimbun showing 61 percent of respondents in favour and 27 percent 
against.136 
Based on such data and the fact the operation continues, it would appear 
that pacifist based norms have had little influence on antipiracy policy decisions. Similar 
to BMD, this attitude may be the result of society’s recognition that pirate activity, 
although thousands of miles away, has the potential to impact the nation’s economy and 
way of life. It may be one thing for a society to be pacifist on certain issues, but it is 
another to expect that a society would simply allow criminal activity to continue at the 
expense of its well-being.   
b. External Factors and Antipiracy 
Unlike societal norms, some would argue that external factors based in 
realist thinking have had a significant influence on Japanese antipiracy policy. Although 
the piracy threat is not tied directly to state sanctioned activity, the response it has 
engendered by the international community has raised concern for Japan regarding its 
current security relationships and obligations. Based on such pretexts, Japanese leaders 
enacted antipiracy policies in response to a UN resolution from 2008, which “authorized 
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a series of decisive measures to combat [piracy],”137 as well as due to concerns stemming 
from Chinese involvement in the effort, which might strengthen U.S.-China relations at 
the expense of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.138 In conjunction with valid 
economic and security concerns regarding Japan’s SLOCs and the need the need to keep 
them open, it would seem the realist-based argument that external threats factor into the 
antipiracy policy-making process is legitimate. However, it is difficult to say such 
influence comes at the expense of party influence. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion offers some perspective as to the role the DPJ has had 
on elements of maritime security policy, relative to the LDP and other international 
relations based factors. While the party was in an opposition role, it initially maintained 
policy views that countered those of the LDP. However, as the party grew in strength, its 
views adapted, particularly on the issue of BMD. As for IR based factors, there is reason 
to believe external influences have played into the policy-making process, again 
particularly with respect to BMD. The policy progress made however indicates the 
influence of pacifist norms may be waning. This newfound balance among parties, norms 
and external factors in the post Cold War environment are worth discussing in greater 
detail, namely, the seemingly increased influence of parties in Japan over the last decade, 
and what may have contributed to this dynamic. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The monumental shift in Japanese domestic politics in 2009 has provided an 
opportunity to discuss the potential for change across a range of policy issues. This thesis 
has attempted to address a small sampling of policy issues tied to maritime security, by 
focusing on BMD and antipiracy in an effort to determine whether changes may come 
under the DPJ. Recalling the hypothesis from Chapter I, the findings of the thesis 
pertaining to BMD and antipiracy can now be used to determine the validity of the 
hypothesis. 
A. ASSESSING THE HYPOTHESIS  
It was hypothesized that although policy changes from the newly elected DPJ 
might be expected, in the near term, few instances would occur in which the party would 
depart from the policy practices of its predecessor. The findings of this thesis seem to 
support the hypothesis, as both BMD and antipiracy have experienced little, if any policy 
changes since the DPJ came to power. In each case, examples highlight varying degrees 
of acquiescence on the part of the DPJ, and in some instances, further policy expansion 
on what the LDP had enacted prior to its decline. Continued collaboration exists with the 
United States, as well as funding for BMD, and the current administration has overseen 
the opening of the first overseas base in Djibouti in support of antipiracy operations. 
However, the continuity of policy cannot be perceived as the DPJ simply holding to the 
status quo, as external influences factor heavily into the current state of each maritime 
security realm, whether it is the potential missile threat from the DPRK or persistence of 
the United States that has given way to BMD, or the need to secure SLOCs by 
conducting antipiracy operations. 
It is also important to recognize that this thesis has a limited approach in assessing 
this hypothesis, as BMD and antipiracy are only two elements of maritime security, 
which falls into a much broader security policy realm. The very nature of BMD, given its 
necessity for defending against ballistic missile threats, its costliness, and scope of 
integration with the United States, suggests it is perhaps one of the most critical 
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components of Japanese security. Likewise, in the uncertainty of the post-Cold War 
security environment, a case could be made that it is in the interest of any country, 
especially Japan, to undertake antipiracy efforts to ensure the security of a major source 
of its economic vitality. However, not every security policy realm carries the same 
weight, which makes it difficult to suggest that based on these findings the DPJ will 
simply hold to the policy practices of its predecessor across the board. While the policy 
nature of the thesis is limited in scope, and could use further examples to test the validity 
of the hypothesis, another element of the thesis helps identify the significance of the DPJ 
in the policy making process. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF IR FACTORS 
Simply comparing the positions of the DPJ and LDP on BMD and antipiracy 
might lead one to believe the two parties have similar policy perspectives in both realms 
and perhaps across the board. While the heart of the discussion focused on identifying 
any differences between the two parties, particular attention was also given to the role of 
pacifist societal norms and external factors that have historically influenced the nature of 
Japan’s security policy. This focus served the purpose of contextualizing the role of 
parties in the policy-making process, and helps to counter any notion that based on the 
results pertaining to BMD and antipiracy, the DPJ and LDP are simply homogenous on 
security in general.  
It would be difficult to assess a party’s perspective and influence on security 
policies without addressing the influence of societal norms and external influences. For 
example, during the Cold War years, the LDP was not free to implement whatever 
security policies it deemed necessary for the benefit of Japan. Rather, security policy was 
the result of a delicate balance between pacifist norms that argued against any sort of 
remilitarization, the influence of the broader international environment that included the 
United States and the communist threat, and lastly, the ability of the party to address the 




in the post-Cold War environment, as a more dynamic security environment has arguably 
replaced a decline in pacifist tendencies, but the LDP, and now the DPJ, continue to 
operate relative to these influences.  
IR factors expand the discussion by considering other influences on security 
policy to which the parties are subject. This combination of party perspective and IR 
factors provides a clearer picture for understanding both past and near term security 
policy decisions in Japan, and thereby, countering any notion that security policy is 
simply the result of the whims of parties that view the threat environment in the same 
manner.  
C. EXPANDING THE DISCUSSION 
Although the findings of this thesis are useful, room exists to expand the 
discussion to identify better how and where the DPJ might change security policy in the 
future, both in the maritime realm and more broadly. Additionally, the findings on BMD 
and antipiracy alone have implications beyond Japan, namely for the United States, other 
regional actors, and multilateral security efforts abroad. Each of these matters is worth 
briefly outlining.  
1. Indian Ocean Refueling Operations 
While certainly other security policy issues would expand the analysis of this 
thesis, one example in the maritime security realm that would enhance the discussion 
pertains to Indian Ocean refueling operations. The operation began in 2001, following the 
terrorist attack of September 11, and passing of the Antiterror Special Measures Law. 
Japan positioned a refueling vessel in the Indian Ocean with destroyers, and provided fuel 
to ships from the United States, Canada, Pakistan, and a number of European nations 
until the beginning of 2010.139 The duration of the support operation may suggest great 
willingness on the part of Japan to support the coalition effort (Operation Enduring 
Freedom in particular), but the Indian Ocean refueling operation did not go without 
controversy. 
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From the beginning, the issue of collective security has been at the forefront of 
the Indian Ocean refueling debate. The LDP was initially able to overcome internal 
debate on the issue. However, as the coalition effort expanded beyond Afghanistan and 
the DPJ became a more formidable opposition party, the refueling operation was heavily 
criticized, especially as news emerged “in late 2007 that the MSDF had incorrectly 
reported fuel-supply figures, and suspicions arose that the [United States] had diverted 
Japanese fuel to operations in Iraq.”140 On this basis, the DPJ opposed the continued 
renewal of the operation, and the ruling party eventually suspended refueling operations. 
The question is why the DPJ decided to reverse this policy, while BMD and antipiracy 
continue to be at the forefront of Japan’s maritime security priorities? With more time, 
this question would have been addressed in greater detail; however, a number of reasons 
can be offered.  
Two comparisons come to mind when considering the decision to discontinue the 
refueling operation in the Indian Ocean. The first pertains to cost differentials with BMD; 
the second deals with the multilateral nature of the operation versus that of antipiracy. In 
the first case, BMD has been costly from the start, and although controversial, these costs 
have arguably committed Japan for the long haul, as it would not prove fruitful to have 
contributed such large funding for the greater part of a decade and not see returns. Cost 
figures for the entire refueling operation are said to have been approximately $300 
million,141 which provides an opportunity for the DPJ to cease operations based on 
ideological differences with the LDP rather than having to worry about sunken costs. 
Another point to consider is the multilateral nature of the operation. Initially conducted in 
support of U.S. led antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan, the operation had the 
approval of the UN. However, the controversial 2003 Iraq invasion served as a point of 
contention. Unlike the UN-backed antipiracy efforts in the HOA region today, the lack of 
UN backing for operations in Iraq provided the DPJ with a reason to cease refueling 
operations.  
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These are only brief thoughts on one other policy issue that in and of itself 
highlights a different set of circumstances under which the DPJ might be willing to alter 
the previous security policies of the LDP. Further analysis would be welcomed to offer 
greater clarity on what the DPJ is willing and able to change, and under what 
circumstances. However, the outcome of the analysis pertaining to BMD and antipiracy 
has further use given the implications each has beyond Japan.  
2. Policy Implications for the Future and Beyond Japan 
The decision on the part of the DPJ to maintain and even expand on policy tied to 
BMD and antipiracy has implications beyond Japan worth considering. For obvious 
reasons, BMD policy has the greatest implications for the United States and Japan’s 
regional neighbors, while policy decisions on antipiracy may reflect some broader 
implications for the UN or other multilateral entities that Japan has interests in or is tied. 
Each of these is discussed only briefly, but serve as a foundation for further research. 
Lastly, based on the findings of this thesis as to how the DPJ has addressed these specific 
maritime security issues, some basic conclusions are offered as to how the party may 
address security policy in the near term. 
a. BMD: Implications for the United States and Regional Actors 
The decision on the part of the DPJ to continue with BMD has a number 
of positive implications for the United States. Aside from the obvious cooperation 
between the two countries and the strengthening of the bilateral relationship that dates 
back to the post-World War II era, the integration also solidifies U.S. presence in the East 
Asia region. This integration is critical amidst recent U.S. concerns tied to the budget and 
potential scaling back of forces. Additionally, continued U.S. presence in the region via 
BMD collaboration provides the United States with the opportunity to monitor and meet 
potential challenges tied to the rise of China and improvement of DPRK ballistic missile 
technology. Christopher Hughes summarizes the importance of such continued 
collaboration to the United States, stating that it “continues to bolster U.S. regional 
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military hegemony,”142 and it could easily be argued that BMD accomplishes this point 
in lieu of a more conventional U.S. presence. While BMD has positive implications for 
the United States, it comes at the expense of regional relations for Japan.  
China and the DPRK are less likely to have a positive outlook on Japan’s 
continued pursuit of a viable BMD system. As an established nuclear power, China’s 
concerns stem from fears that an integrated BMD system in its immediate vicinity 
“would undermine its deterrent capability.”143 Also, with other regional interests 
involving a U.S. backed Taiwan, concern exists the BMD umbrella could potentially 
extend to its cross strait interests. Meanwhile, although it is difficult to read into North 
Korean policy on BMD, Japan’s pursuit of the system has done little to halt the country’s 
own pursuit of improved delivery systems. Debate over whether or not an effective 
system would mitigate any DPRK threat is best saved for other research, but it would not 
be a stretch to suggest that a BMD system does little to instill comfort into North Korean 
leadership.  
b. Antipiracy: Multilateral Implications 
MSDF involvement in antipiracy efforts off the HOA has implications for 
future multilateral efforts, as it signals a willingness on the part of Japan to contribute to 
security efforts globally. Should Japan continue to support such efforts, it could 
eventually expand its involvement to include multilateral combat efforts, but again, such 
a scenario is subject to further research. However, just as BMD has the potential for 
negative implications regionally, so to do antipiracy or similar multilateral operations. In 
this case, China may take issue with an active Japan that has expanded its area of 
influence beyond the East Asia region, “[countering] China’s rising influence… and 
[protecting] its SLOCs.”144 
                                                 
142 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization, 143. 
143 Nick Bisley, “Securing the ‘Anchor of Regional Stability’? The Transformation of the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance and East Asian Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs 30, no. 1 (April 2008): 91. 
144 Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization, 143. 
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c. Near Term Implications for Broader Security Policy 
The manner in which the DPJ has handled BMD and antipiracy offers 
some insight as to how the party may address broader security policies in the near term. 
With respect to BMD, while it could be argued that sunken costs might have forced the 
DPJ to proceed with a program it otherwise would have terminated (which may be true), 
consideration must also be given to the very real threat BMD is intended to counter. 
Therefore, it stands to reason that the DPJ will handle future security policy and 
programs aimed at countering potentially significant threats, be it DPRK missiles, or an 
increased Chinese military presence, in the same way. In this post-Cold War security 
environment, the potential for threats of this nature may be increased, but fortunately for 
Japan, it is safe to assume security issues, such as involvement in antipiracy efforts 
abroad, may be more common. 
The party’s handling of antipiracy efforts provides some insight as to how 
it may handle similar security issues in the future. Two aspects of the operation come to 
mind, namely the fact it is a multilateral effort, and that it deals with securing vital sea 
lanes. The fact the party has since expanded the scope of the mission to include forward 
basing suggests a willingness to commit to each. Therefore, it would not be surprising to 
see the DPJ pursue other multilateral efforts in which it could contribute to enhancing 
peace in the international security environment, while also ensuring its own national 
interests were met. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The circumstances involving BMD and antipiracy offer some insight as to how 
the DPJ will handle security policy in general. However, there are certain to be more 
events and issues that may indicate the DPJ will take a different approach to security 
from what has been seen in less than two years of rule. Such events do not have to be 
directly related to security, as is the case with the March 2011 earthquake in Japan. Not to 
downplay the tremendous loss of life and tragedy that has befallen the country, but the 
damage and costliness of the quake has already impacted the economy and the 
government, perhaps having implications for the defense budget and potentially 
 76
continuity of rule, all of which can influence future security policy. Likewise, the recent 
global economic concerns, should they persist, stand to impact the ability of Japan to 
afford the cost of securing itself, especially since the country’s debt ratio was estimated at 
197% of GDP in 2010.145 These circumstances alone may elongate the process of 
determining the DPJ’s broader security policies, which makes this subject one worthy of 
greater research and discussion. 
                                                 
145 Lily Nonomiya, “Japan’s Debt Ratio to Rise to 197% of GDP Next Year, OECD Says,” 
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